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Abstract  
 
The past decade has been crisis ridden for the EU. In addition to the immediate influence, 
crises damage reputation and legitimacy, by crisis communication this harm can be 
alleviated. EC, the communicator on the supranational level, acting in the name of the 
whole EU, has had to deal with these situations. 
 
This thesis views the crisis communication strategies EC uses in three recent and prominent 
crises: Greek government-debt crisis, migration crisis and Brexit. Adding the tools offered 
by situational crisis communication theory by Coombs and image repair theory by Benoit 
to the European studies’ general framework, the author, using the methods of discourse 
analyses, researches EC crisis communication and the social consequences of it for the 
reputation and legitimacy of EC and EU. 
 
By analysing 231 speeches by the President of the EC and by the commissioners 
responsible for the most affected policy field in the crisis, the crisis communication 
strategies are identified. Looking at media response and public opinion, the findings 
suggest that crisis communication contributes to shaping the context within which the 
social consequences regarding reputation/legitimacy can occur. 
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Introduction 
 
The past decade has been all but bright and stable for the European Union (EU). It has been 
crisis-ridden and it has provoked the questions of legitimacy of the EU and its institutions. 
There are several recent crises that still cause a stir and have an impact on the whole EU, 
these crises have put the legitimacy of the European integration project in question. 
 
The Eurozone crisis as the first from many to hit EU has inspired various authors to reflect 
upon the EU in crisis. Numerous articles and books have been published that consider this 
phenomenon searching for causes and possible solutions. Peet and La Guardia propose the 
key to recovery might be in the disciplining possibility for national governments to go bust 
(no-bail-out rule) restored and in fiscal federalism with some shared risks to stabilise the 
euro zone enough to withstand such shock.
1
 Despite somewhat dubious reference in the title 
to the EU having passed the crisis, in his reflection on the Economic and Monetary Union 
and the Eurozone crisis, Majone poses a question about the limits of the European 
integration – has an excessive harmonisation produced an unwanted reverse effect? Is this 
the root cause of instability?
2
 Arguing that there is a trend towards further differentiation, 
Dinan et al come to a rather discouraging conclusion that even if the incapacity to provide 
solutions to the numerous, severe and mutating crises might not lead to the complete EU 
disintegration, as the value of EU to Member States’ governments probably overweighs the 
need for the ultimate divergence, but to a collapse that brings fourth the restructuring of 
parts of the policy areas.
3
 
 
Besides substantive crisis, these crises have also resulted in crisis of EU legitimacy. Crisis 
is a threat to institution’s reputation (and therefore to its legitimacy). Legitimacy and 
reputation are closely interconnected, they are both perceptions of approval of 
                                                          
1
 Peet, J., La Guardia, A. (2014) Unhappy Union. How the Euro Crisis – and Europe – Can Be Fixed. 
Economist Books 
2
 Majone, G. (2014) Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-crisis: Has the Integration Gone Too Far? 
Cambrige University Press 
3
 Dinan, D., Nugent, N., Paterson E. W. (2017) Conclusions: Crisis Without End? The European Union in 
Crisis. Palgrave. 
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organisation’s or institution’s actions based on stakeholders’ evaluation.4 However, the two 
concepts are still not the same. Whereas the first is linked to conformity with defined or 
implicit standards and rules, the second is associated with the positive image of the 
organisation in the eyes of the stakeholders.
5
 Crisis causes damage and this directly 
influences the way stakeholders interact with the institution. Crisis communication is a tool 
to minimise the damage, to repair institution’s image and/or prevent further damage to it.6 
EU is no different in these aspects from any other organisation, meaning that if there is 
crisis, its reputation/legitimacy will be damaged. And in face of such danger, the 
organization might attempt to avert damage to reputation/legitimacy. More precisely, the 
European Commission (EC), being at the institutional heart of the Union
7
, the guardian of 
the Treaties and the supranational voice of the EU, takes the role of the lead speaker and 
becomes responsible for crisis communication acts that are designed to minimise damage. 
Interested in how the EU aims to stem the fallout of its crises, this study therefore 
investigates the crisis communication of the EC. 
 
While I consider the EU/EC as an organization like any other, and therefore susceptible to 
being understood in terms of organizational theory, it is still specific in the sense that the 
position of the EC as one-of-a-kind a supranational institution, that has unique relation 
towards one group of its stakeholders, the Member States and furthermore the citizens of 
the EU.
8
 The consequences of crisis communication can be assessed by the reactions of the 
receivers, of which the Member States are by far not the only, but from the aspect of 
                                                          
4
 King, G. Brayden, Whetten, A. David (2008) Rethinking the Relationship Between Reputation and 
Legitimacy: A Social Actor Conceptualization. Corporate Reputation Review, Vol 11, No 3 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Coombs, W. T. (2007) Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The Development and 
Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory. Corporate Reputation Review, September 2007, 
Volume 10. 
7
 Dinan, D., Nugent, N., Paterson E. W. (2017) A Multi-dimensional Crisis. The European Union in Crisis. 
Palgrave. 
8
 The relationship between Member States and the Commission can be brought back to the principal-agent 
duality, in the ideal case there is mutual understanding and support, but when agent oversteps or is perceived 
overstepping the limits of the responsibilities delegated by principal or underperforms in the eyes of the 
principal, the arising problem undermines supranational agent’s reputation and legitimacy. Promoting the 
general intrest of the Union and being an executive of the EU, it is also accountable to the citizens, afterall, in 
addition to being the citizens of the EU, in democracy the Member States’ governments (principal) are elected 
by their citizens and have the right to scrutinise the acts of the agent (EC) chosen by their eletctees. 
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legitimacy and reputation the most important stakeholders for EC. In order to study the 
varying impact of EC crisis communication in current crises, this study investigates three 
crises and the EC crisis communication strategies in those crises. 
 
The present study thereby seeks to address a gap in the existing literature in that no prior 
research has offered an ample insight into the described problem from this angle. The other 
authors have explored other, related issues such as EC communication, political 
communication, EU public communication, as shown below, but they have not explored 
EC crisis communication and its social consequences
9
. Meyer, in his study of EC 
communication, is viewing EC’s inability to properly communicate as a key factor leading 
to legitimacy problems. The root cause of these deficiency is found in the specific system 
of governance that deprives EC from necessary political authority and at the same time 
enables the Member States’ governments to direct the public discontent towards EC and 
away from themselves.
10
 While he has studied the shortages of routine communication, he 
did not include the arguable even more demanding aspect of EU communication during 
crisis. EU and EC communication and its various aspects are for example discussed in 
"Public Communication in the European Union: History, Perspectives and Challenges", this 
publication contains chapters on EC communication with candidate countries, challenges of 
the EC spokespersons, public relations of the EC.
11
 However, what remains unaddressed is 
the specific mode of public communication that is crisis communication. There are authors 
that deal with political communication during crisis, but not the crisis communication by 
the EC – Mohl and Sondermann have found that public statements issued by euro area 
politicians, especially, when from AAA-rated country, increased the bond spreads.
12
 In 
light of the specific position of the EC in crisis communication, being the most central 
communicator, who represents the supranational level and interests, it is therefore 
                                                          
9
 Engaging in communicative acts, EC as a political actor, brings forward social consequences that are to be 
understood also as the political consequences. 
10
 Meyer, C. (1999) Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union’s 
Communication Deficit. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1999. 
11
 Valentini, C., Nesti, G. (Eds.) (2010) Public Communication in the European Union: History, Perspectives 
and Challenges. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
12
 Mohl, P., Sondermann, D. (2013) Has political communication during the crisis impacted sovereign bond 
spreads in the euro area? Applied Economics Letters, 20:1, 48-61. 
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worthwhile exploring the crisis communication of the EC. Before the background of the 
existing literature this research aims to contribute to the existing literature connecting the 
aspects that so far have been viewed separately or in different dual constellations. This 
thesis is researching how EC is communicating EU in crisis and what kind of consequences 
EC crisis communication has from the aspect of reputation and legitimacy of the EC and 
the EU. 
 
In order to do so, this study brings crisis communication theories into dialogue with the 
field of the European studies. Whilst discussing crisis and/or legitimacy problems in great 
length
13
, even making the connection between communication and reputation/legitimacy
14
, 
these issues are currently absent from European studies literature, both empirical and 
theoretical. Despite its interdisciplinary nature, European studies does not provide the tools 
to describe the crisis communication with necessary precision in order to analyse this topic 
in depth. This shortcoming can be ameliorated by bringing in crisis communication 
theories, which by itself represents a contribution to the field of European studies, by 
adding to its theoretical/analytical tools. Crisis communication theories that form a sub-
category of public relations field and are closely connected to organisation theories and 
social psychology have been applied both on corporations and individual politicians
15
, in 
order to account for the way in which the EU/EC has attempted to deal with the 
reputation/legitimacy fallout of multiple crises, it is therefore possible, and analytically 
useful, to draw on these theories. 
 
In light of these aims, this study addresses the question, what kind of crisis 
communication strategies the EC deploys and what are the consequences of these 
                                                          
13
 Dinan, D et al (2017) The European Union in Crisis. Palgrave; Schmidt, V. A. (2015) The Eurozone’s 
Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy: Can the EU Rebuild Public Trust and Support for European Economic 
Integration? European Economy Discussion Paper. European Union, 2015. 
14
 Blom-Hansen, J., Finke, D. (2017) Reputation and Organizational Politics: Inside the EU Commission, 
EUSA Fifteenth Biennial Conference, 4-6 May 2017; Meyer, C. (1999) Political Legitimacy and the 
Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union’s Communication Deficit. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1999. 
15
 Benoit, L. W. (2015). Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: Image Repair Theory and Research. State 
University of New York Press; Coombs, W. T. et al (2010) Why a concern for apologia and crisis 
communication?, Corporate Communications: An International Journal, Vol. 15 Issue: 4, pp.337-349. 
 9 
 
strategies for reputation and political legitimacy of the EC and the EU. As the purpose 
of crisis communication is to minimise the damage to reputation or repair it, and maintain 
or strengthen legitimacy,
16
 crisis communication as discursive practice is expected to shape 
reputation/legitimacy. Therefore the analysis performed in this research attempts to 
demonstrate, how the deployment of different crisis communication strategies contributes 
to social consequences, namely the gravity of reputational/legitimacy loss. Aware of the 
myriad of factors shaping reputation and legitimacy of EU/EC, no causal claim is being 
made. Causal theorising is not the aim of this study. Instead, adopting a discursive view on 
social reality
17
, it regards crisis communication as a discursive practice which contribute to 
shaping the conditions on the basis of which social consequences of a crisis, reputational 
and legitimacy, eventually manifest themselves. Yet, even if there are many factors that 
influence the success EC communication in general (see Chapter 2) and therefore also the 
crisis communication, it is possible to see patterns in how the EC crisis communication 
works and if it brings about the desired consequences. Moreover, the present study must be 
understood as explorative in character, there is no public information or data on the EC 
crisis communication strategies, it is based solely on the public materials, the primary 
corpus is chosen accordingly. 
 
The research will rely on in depth analysis of the speeches published online and the 
reception of them, taking into consideration the general discourse they fit into (legislation, 
political actions, interviews, events, public opinion surveys). The sources that are analysed 
are obtained via European Commission press release database (RAPID), EC public 
websites (Eurobarometer, Directorate-General for Communication (DG COMM) 
homepage) and any other online channel available for the researcher. 
 
The study answers the proposed questions by analysing EC crisis communication in three 
different crises – the European debt crisis, migration crisis and Brexit. Within enhancing 
                                                          
16
 Benoit, L. W. (2015). Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: Image Repair Theory and Research. State 
University of New York Press; Coombs, W. T. (2007) Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: 
The Development and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory. Corporate Reputation 
Review, September 2007, Volume 10 
17
 Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and Social Change. Polity Press. 
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the credibility and objectivity of the research, in one of the crises there will be a narrower 
focus found e.g. Greek government-debt crisis. The crises are recent ones to be able to fully 
use the predefined online nature of the sample and to follow the reception/reaction side of 
the crisis communication which is vital for the examination of the consequences for 
reputation/legitimacy and evaluation of the impact of given strategies. In case of all crises 
the texts to be used form the crisis communication side are speeches of the President and 
the commissioners, with the only exception in case of Brexit, when also the speeches of the 
European Chief Negotiator have been included. The consequences of the crisis 
communication for the reputation and legitimacy of the EC and EU in general are viewed, 
introducing the wider discursive context into which the EC crisis communication places 
and in which it interacts, the changes it brings about. This is done by looking at public 
opinion, actions that followed the communication and assessments of the consequences in 
the literature. The purpose of assessing the social consequences in this way is not to 
establish a causal link, but to elucidate how the discursive intervention in the form of crisis 
communication has shaped the conditions before which the consequences of crisis for 
reputation/legitimacy unfold. For this purpose the secondary corpus of public opinion 
surveys, academic papers and media articles from relevant periods is used. 
 
In Chapter 1 the theoretical framework of the thesis is being presented. Chapter 1.1. 
discusses the questions of reputation and legitimacy are both from the angle of political 
studies and the organisational theory, also their relation with and dependency on 
communication is viewed. Chapter 1.2. concentrates on the concept of crisis, also EU in 
crisis and gives an insight into crisis communication theories used in this research. Chapter 
2 is dedicated on the routine procedures of the EC’s communication, the strategies, means 
and actors of this field are being presented. Chapter 3 introduces the methodology and 
research design. The actual research chapters are divided by crises and in two subchapters 
analyse EC communication and assess it against the reception of it. The thesis is completed 
by a concluding chapter in which findings are summarised, implications discussed. 
  
 11 
 
1. Theoretical framework 
1.1 Legitimacy, Reputation and Communication in Political Studies and 
in Organisational Theory 
 
In this chapter the notions or concepts of legitimacy and reputation are being discussed – as 
they are crucial to this research it is important to position them in time and in discourse of 
both political studies and organisational theory, therefore a brief historic overview and 
some insights into relevant literature are offered. First we discuss legitimacy as such in a 
larger context of EU, then turn to the legitimacy of the EC and finally we look into the 
concepts of reputation and legitimacy in organisational theory, explaining the need to 
distinguish between the two terms. 
 
Already in 1922 Max Weber
18
 distinguishes three types of legitimate rule – charismatic, 
traditional and legal-rational. Whereas opposed to one charismatic leader or tradition based 
e.g. tribal traditions rule, the legal rational type of legitimate rule or authority is based on 
the set of uniform principles, legal and natural law principles govern an individual: "[…] 
development of the modern state is identical indeed with that of modern officialdom and 
bureaucratic organizations just as the development of modern capitalism is identical with 
the increasing bureaucratization of economic enterprise."
19
 
 
Whereas Weber asserts this for the state, this no less applies to the EU. In other words, the 
"nature of the beast"
20
 is legal-rational and already on basis of Weber’s argumentation we 
can see the connections between that type of rule and both the structure and working 
methods of organisations, the similarities to which we will return later in this chapter. 
However, in 1994, after the Maastricht crisis
21
, this represents a challenge for the EU, 
                                                          
18
 Weber, M. (1922). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen 
19
 Weber, M. (1958) The three types of legitimate rule. Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions, 4 
(1), pp. 1-11.  
20
 Risse, T. (1996) Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy 
Analysis Meet the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 34, No. 1, March 1996. 
21
 Maastricht Treaty ratification crisis in 1992-1993, when Danish voters rejected the Treaty in June 1992 to 
approve it on second referendum in May 1993 after sufficient opt-outs. 
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Featherstone notes that Monnet’s original ideas of an elitist and technocratic High 
Authority to watch over and push forward the integration have lost its appeal as it lacks the 
necessary public support.
22
 The threat that is embedded in lack of dialogue about the needs 
of the public and the morality of power is the one Habermas saw creeping around the 
corner as early as 1976, when he notes that all norms that do not regulate generalizable, 
common interests are overstepping the moral boundaries, they are based upon force, 
constitute a normative power i.e. when a government or another entity filling that position 
fails to rationally justify its decisions, there is an imminent crisis threat. And this is the 
crisis of legitimacy,
23
 which could be avoided or resolved by undistorted communication.
24
 
As the legal-rational legitimate rule involves the kind of political legitimacy that is in very 
large extent based on trust of the governed and agreement and acceptance of those who 
give the power to rule,
25
 it demands constant interaction with subjects or stakeholders to 
grow the reputational capital and assure the legitimacy
26
. Gurr has put it very simply and 
elegantly in his 1971 writing: "governance can be considered legitimate in so far as its 
subjects regard it as proper and deserving of support".
27
 This is also the understanding this 
study adopts. 
 
This all in turn brings us to the concept of democratic deficit, that the EU itself defines as 
seeming inaccessibility of the EU institutions and the decision-making procedures to the 
ordinary citizen due to their complexity.
28
 The position of the researchers in the question of 
democratic legitimacy of the EU is quite ambivalent. While Moravcsik deems EU 
democratically legitimate
29
, Majone, who held initially the same position
30
 reconsiders 
                                                          
22
 Featherstone, K. (1994) Jean Monnet and the "Democratic Deficit" in the European Union. Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Vol. 32, No. 2 June 1994. 
23
 Habermas, J. (1976) Legitimation Crisis. London: Heinemann. 
24
 Habermas, J. (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 2. Lifeworld And System: A Critique 
Of Functionalist Reason. Beacon Press 
25
 Meyer, C. (1999) Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union’s 
Communication Deficit. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1999. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Gurr, T. R. (1971) Why Men Rebel. Stanford, CA: Princeton University Press, p 185. 
28
 EUR-Lex, Glossary of Summaries > Democratic deficit, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/democratic_deficit.html?locale=en [all the online sources in the thesis last 
used 19.5.2018] 
29
 Moravcsik, A. (2002) In defence of the democratic deficit: reassessing legitimacy in the European Union. 
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himself over time, detecting problems in universal community method of governance and 
seeing the differentiation as a solution for legitimate governance
31
, which with its dangers 
was briefly discussed in the introduction. Lacking in mutual understanding, that causes 
democratic deficit, that in turn can cause legitimacy crisis, have their foundation in 
insufficient communication. EU’s legitimacy depends very much on the communication, 
which thinking back on what Habermas implies, is probably an universal trait in obtaining 
any kind of legitimacy. 
 
In case of EU and also EC there is still a need to mention several types of legitimacy. 
Scharpf defines the input legitimacy as the government by people, meaning that the 
governing processes in general correspond to the preferences of the governed (as also 
shown by Weber and Habermas) and the output legitimacy as the government for the 
people i.e. the adopted policies are in general solutions to the common problems.
32
 Schmidt 
defines also the third category of legitimacy, that is throughput legitimacy i.e. 
governance with the people, meaning the openness of the institutions to consult and 
include the citizens.
33
 These are the three dimensions that constitute the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU and also for the EC, but how they operate is different:  
Importantly, the interaction effects of these three legitimizing mechanisms differ. Input and 
output can involve a trade-off whereby better output performance through effective policy 
outcomes can make up for little input via citizen participation or government responsiveness, 
and failed output can still be legitimated by extensive citizen input. Throughput, in contrast, 
offers no such trade-offs. If of good quality, throughput disappears from view; if of bad 
quality, it may taint the output policies or skew the input politics.
34
  
This means that resultful, solution orientated policy can justify the lesser involvement of 
citizens’ wishes and the lacking communication between governing entity and the 
governed, also the feeling of inclusion in the policymaking could compensate for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol 40, Issue 4. 
30
 Majone, G. (1998) Europe’s Democratic Deficit. European Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 5-28. 
31
 Majone, G. (2009) Dilemmas of European Integration. Oxford. 
32
 Scharpf, F. W. (2003) Problem-solving effectiveness and democratic accountability in the EU, MPIfG 
working paper, No. 03/1. 
33
 Schmidt, V. A. (2013) Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 
‘Throughput’, Political Studies: 2013, Vol. 61, pp.2–22. 
34
 Schmidt, V. A .(2015) The Eurozone’s Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy: Can the EU Rebuild Public Trust, 
p. 10. 
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weaker output. In the current study we have to consider input and output legitimacy, which 
are directly related to the communication and also visible in the distinction the EC makes in 
its communication strategy between client groups: "As an executive service, DG COMM 
ensures that high quality country specific information and analysis are fed into the 
College’s decision making process"35 i.e. it is listening to its citizens and obtaining input 
legitimacy and "as a communication service, DG COMM ensures that a simple, clear and 
understandable message focussed on Commission's priorities is communicated to the media 
and other multipliers and to EU citizens and engages with them"
36
 i.e. convincing citizens 
that everything is done in their best interest and achieving the output legitimacy. We will 
return to the structure of communication in EC in Chapter 2. 
 
As we have established the importance of communication in legitimacy, we can take a look, 
what are the consequences of inadequate communication. The immediate result can be a 
crisis like it happened in 1999
37
: "Europe was left decapitated last night as the entire 
European Commission resigned en masse after a devastating report by an independent 
committee of inquiry which found that they had "lost control of the administration."
38
 
Meyer argues in his 1999 study
39
 that the main reason behind the EC resignation was the 
unprecedented media attention. He deems the public communication as a major factor that 
has impact on the political legitimacy of the EU and the communication work done by the 
EC has a crucial role to play in it. The author is explaining why EC has failed in getting 
public support by communicating its routine work and has been unable to answer the media 
adequately during the crisis periods: "The Commission was confronted with legitimacy 
expectations appropriate to a political, not a technocratic institution. Its inability to meet 
these expectations showed first and most visibly at the Commission’s interface with the 
                                                          
35
 DG Communication Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/strategic-plan-
2016-2020-dg-comm_april2016_en.pdf, p. 10. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Due to the corruption allegations Santer Commission resigned colletctively in spring 1999. 
38
 Walker, M. (1999) EU chiefs resign en masse. The Guardian. 16.3.1999, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/mar/16/eu.politics1  
39
 Meyer, C. (1999) Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union’s 
Communication Deficit. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1999, pp. 617–39. 
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media."
40
 
 
And the EC learned from its mistakes by recognising its weaknesses e.g. the White Paper 
on European Governance
41
, and even in the institutional issues database DORIE that is 
managed by Secretariat-General there is a possibility to search by the theme Democratic 
deficit – democratic legitimacy (the number of hits is currently ta more than 400 
documents
42
). After the failure of the ratification of the Constitution it took up a new, more 
professional and structured approach towards communication:  
Thus the President of the Commission, José Barroso, and Vice-President Wallström have 
launched a communication plan to improve the public understanding of EU and its activities 
and to strengthen a common sense of belonging between citizens. This strategy comprises 
several measures: the publication of programmatic documents, the improvement of already 
existing services, the adoption of new online tools, and the provision of funds for civil 
society’s initiatives.43 
This proves that EC understood the role of communication in achieving legitimacy, and is 
dedicated to improving its performance in all three dimensions of legitimacy by using 
appropriate tools. As we can also see later in Chapter 2, this direction of communication 
strategy continues until now and it is continuously evolving to keep up with the 
developments in general media and public sphere e.g. using digital communication and 
social media. 
 
EC Directorate General for Communication (DG COMM) measures the success of the 
communication and the accomplishment of its general objective – making the citizens see 
that EU is working to improve their lives (output legitimacy) and that they are involved in 
decisions and policy making (input legitimacy) i.e. the political legitimacy of the EU – 
against the impact indicator Percentage of EU citizens having a positive image of the EU
44
: 
                                                          
40
 Ibid, p. 635. 
41
 European governance - A white paper, COM/2001/0428 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52001DC0428  
42
 DORIE database, http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/result.do  
43
 Valentini, C. , Nesti, G (Eds.) (2010) Public Communication in the European Union: History, Perspectives 
and Challenges. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 1. 
44
 DG Communication Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/strategic-plan-
2016-2020-dg-comm_april2016_en.pdf, p. 8, 14, 20, 28. 
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Figure 1: Image of the EU  
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
Looking at the chart above already on the first sight there seems to be a certain correlation 
between the highs and lows of positive perception of EU, which is seen as a measure or 
indicator of legitimacy both by the EC and by the author of this research, and the timeline 
of several crises that have hit EU. For example a sharp drop towards negative image can be 
seen from the end of 2009, when the Eurozone crisis began, it stops at its lowest in 2013 
and slowly begins to climb as the economy is recovering. The new decline starts in 2015 
during the refugee crisis and the new low is hit in 2016 before the Brexit referendum. 
 
It has been argued if the legitimacy crisis is caused by other crises or if other crises just 
increase it, at any case there is a consensus, that the connection between crisis and the 
legitimacy exists and that despite the technically legitimate policies on the output side the 
only means to regain political legitimacy or input legitimacy is proper communication.
45
 
                                                          
45
 Schmidt, A. Vivien (2015) The Eurozone’s Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy: Can the EU Rebuild Public 
Trust and Support for European Economic Integration? European Economy Discussion Paper. European 
Union, 2015. 
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Crisis also amplifies the structural causes undermining legitimacy, we have to think about 
the non-transparent policy-making and governing processes, the democratic deficit that we 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. 
 
As the strategies and theories of crisis communication used in this study are mostly used by 
corporate communication world and in lesser extent by individual politicians (see Chapter 
1.2), one might argue, how could they be applicable while observing the crisis 
communication of the EC. Leaving aside the fact that the Weberian bureaucracy is common 
to every large organisation, as it is to modern states, the EU in ways being both or none, a 
hybrid in a way, and the organisational legitimacy theory has the same Weberian roots, the 
much closer connection can be found in the purpose of crisis communication itself – to 
restore reputation
46
 and through that also legitimacy. 
 
There is a fine distinction between legitimacy and reputation and most of the literature 
dealing with this domain does not draw this line at all, but for the purposes of this research 
it seems necessary to still try and find the features that help us separate these two concepts. 
Legitimacy and reputation are closely interconnected, they are both perceptions of approval 
of organisation’s or institution’s actions based on stakeholders’ evaluation. First is linked to 
conformity with defined or implicit standards and rules, second is associated with the 
positive distinction of the organisation in the eyes of the stakeholders.
47
 
 
When we think back to the principal-agent approach towards interpreting the EU
48
, already 
referred to in the introduction, we can also agree with the following:  
An agency’s reputation is a valuable political asset, which increases the autonomy and 
legitimacy of the agency. It can be used to build political support, to increase formal 
discretion, to protect the agency from political attack and to build a set of constituencies in 
the agency’s environment. A reputation-based understanding of agency behaviour is based on 
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the assumption that the agency is driven by concerns of status, legitimacy, and survival rather 
than budget maximization, monetary incentives, or empowerment.
49
 
This means that the adequate communication is means to create or grow the reputational 
capital. In turn this will boost legitimacy. Besides the direct link that solid reputation is also 
increasing legitimacy, it has to be noted that the organisations with higher reputation have 
more flexible conditions of being legitimate in the eyes of the stakeholders. The reputation 
is based on the comparison with other similar organisations i.e. the more positively 
distinguished the entity is the higher reputation it has and high status actors can deviate 
from norms, act in non-conform manner, which is important to keep in mind by examining 
crisis resolution and communication.
50
 
 
What this discussion above has shown, is the interconnectedness of legitimacy, reputation 
and communication in relevant contexts for current study, most importantly the 
demonstration of need for adequate communication in order to achieve legitimacy. Having 
established the link between communication, reputation and legitimacy, the next chapter 
leads us to the next chapter that is dedicated to specific and very significant type of 
communication, namely the crisis communication. 
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1.2 Image Repair Theory and Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
 
In this chapter I am in the first sections going to look into the phenomenon of crisis, what is 
considered crisis in general sense and defining the crisis for the purposes of current 
research, also bringing in the crisis typology that is relevant for the strategy choices in crisis 
communication. The second part of the chapter is dedicated on introducing the crisis 
communication theories themselves, the works of Benoit and Coombs
51
 that form the 
theoretical backbone of this thesis. 
 
Before we get to the crisis communication theories themselves, we have to specify the 
concept of crisis itself as understood in this study. Despite the different definitions and uses 
of the term during history crisis always seems to be an event with big social impact and no 
predictable end.
52
 "Whether crises become moments for positive change depends in part on 
the rhetorical capacities of those who seek such change to define possible and desirable 
goals which resonate with people´s needs and wants and are so construed as to make them 
realizable through mobilizing people to achieve them."
53
 The crisis does not have to be 
something ultimately negative, as perceived in Marxian economics, something that 
constitutes an extreme dissonance that reproduces itself unless some extreme intervention 
takes place and a systemic change is achieved
54
, crisis can be handled as an opportunity, 
that with the right treatment e.g. good crisis communication and the resulting legitimization 
could be an impulse towards positive change. 
 
The crises have become more common, part of daily life, almost a normality, EU entered 
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the "age of crisis" in 2009-10 and this era has by far not ended.
55
 George Soros ironically 
states in 2015 that the authorities of the EU have become "masters" of mishandling the 
succeeding crisis events. And at the time EU was juggling five crises at the same time: the 
Eurozone crisis, Greece debt crisis, migration crisis and the British Brexit referendum as 
internal challenges and one crisis with external nature – the situation in Ukraine.56 Soros 
uses the same expression to describe EU’s crisis managing technique that is known from 
other literature on the subject – muddling through the crises. According to Schweiger this is 
defined as short-term political fixes that bring only temporary respite from crisis.
57
 None of 
the above mentioned crises have been resolved yet and are noticeably affecting the whole 
EU by causing dissatisfaction with policy results and the whole method of governance. 
There are many works on Europe in crisis, some focus on the history
58
, some on politics
59
, 
some take the perspective of external relations
60
, some public sphere and media
61
. There are 
writings concentrating specifically on the EU and its institutions managing the crises and 
having an internal crisis from capability-expectations gap that Hill uses to describe the 
differences between what European Communities had ambitions to do and what it in reality 
could (or could not) deliver 
62
 to reflection papers requested already by the institutions 
themselves e.g. on how to regain legitimacy after crisis
63
. The density of crises has been 
escalating and simultaneously the doubts about the capability of the institutions, including 
the EC, have been growing (see e.g. Majone
64
). Leaving all these writings to the 
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background and coming back to them at later stages when needed, we have to ask, what is 
understood as crisis in this research? 
 
As already stated in the introduction, for the purposes of the current study, crisis is defined 
as a threat to institution’s reputation and/or image, it is a situation that has an immediate 
impact on the relationship with the stakeholders.
65
 The natural and inevitable reaction to 
reputational threat is image repair.
66
 When in crisis an organisation has to react and 
communicate in order to resolve the situation, for the EC this need to respond is aggravated 
as there are always the political aspects of the crisis to be taken into account and it is the 
political legitimacy that is questioned in crisis situations. For firms, the capital is at stake, if 
the worst case scenario happens, they can start anew, under new clean name. For a political 
entity in the other hand, everything is at skate, there is no other possibility than to handle 
the situation as best as it can. This demands a more sophisticated crisis communication than 
for example preventable cluster corporate misdeeds that either happened or not. A crisis 
demands an answer as it usually includes these two components: the organization is 
considered responsible for the situation and/or the behaviour of the organisation is felt to be 
offensive by the stakeholders.
67
 
 
This response is crisis communication strategy. By strategy it is understood in this research 
anything that actors do or more importantly say in response to crisis. It does not necessarily 
have to be conscious choice, but the existence of crisis communication is undeniable and 
therefore also the impact of the strategies on reputation can be observed. There is rarely 
only one strategy used, there are almost always different strategies combined in crisis 
situations – these configurations of crisis communication strategies depend on the type of 
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crisis, the development of crisis and the audience towards whom the communicative act is 
directed.
68
 It is reasonable though to follow certain logic and consistency in crisis 
communication, not all the strategies are to be mixed, as the result may be 
counterproductive. It might cause further harm and discredit the organisation even more 
than the crisis itself did. As one possibility to give guidance in the choice of strategies, 
Coombs distinguishes by the level of attributed accountability three separate crisis clusters: 
1) victim cluster, 2) accidental cluster and 3) preventable cluster. The victim crises are the 
type, where an organisation itself is partly a victim of the crisis event, it is not held 
responsible. Accidental cluster crises involve partial accountability, the organisations 
ability to operate in proper manner is questioned. Preventable cluster has the stakeholders 
feeling deceived or put in harms way by organisation´s misdeeds.
69
 
 
In this research the situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) by W. Timothy 
Coombs will be used, also some aspects of image repair/restoration theory by William 
Benoit. In his earlier works Benoit referred to the theory as image restoration theory, but 
later named it image repair theory as it is not in every case the complete restoration of the 
image is possible
70
. SCCT is applicable to variety of organisational forms, not only 
business enterprises. As the EC also can be defined as an organisation, it is reasonable to 
assume it can also be applied to EC. 
 
There are the primary and supplemental crisis response strategies used in SCCT. Primary 
SCCT crisis response strategies form three groups based upon perceptions of accepting 
responsibility for a crisis: denial, diminish and rebuild and the secondary strategies fall 
under bolstering crisis response strategies.
71
 Deny strategies are meant to break the 
connection between an organisation and the crisis, e.g. if there is no connection there is no 
harm from the crisis, if there is a rumour that causes the crisis, it depends on the acceptance 
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of the audience, including media to really be convinced that a crisis does not exist or there 
is no link between crisis and the organisation.
72
 The diminish category of strategies implies 
that the crisis is not as serious as perceived or that the organisations role in it is lesser, that 
organisation could not control the events leading to the crisis – the purpose is to make the 
stakeholders accept that the crisis belongs to the accidental cluster and therefore lighten the 
responsibility burden.
73
 Rebuild strategies are the best way to increase the reputational 
capital by either showing new positive traits in organisation’s actions or reminding the 
contribution done in past. This strategy type includes moral and material help to victims 
and/or stakeholders i.e. apology or compensation.
74
 Bolstering is used to strengthen the 
organisation’s good image, it may include several means to do it e.g. praising the 
stakeholders, these strategies can be used in combination with three previous ones as they 
alone do not have the required strength to increase the reputational assets.
75
 
 
William Benoit offers the following types of crisis communication strategies: denial, 
evasion of responsibility, reduction of offensiveness, corrective action, mortification.
76
 
Denial includes denying performing the offensive act, it might be strengthened by saying 
who did it (truth here is irrelevant).
77
 Evasion of responsibility lists several possibilities to 
reduce the involvement in crisis, e.g. suggesting that due to lack of information it was not 
possible to avoid the harmful event.
78
 Reduction of offensiveness lists six ways to reduce 
the severity of the acts upon the audience, including minimizing the offensive impact of the 
act and/or strengthening one’s own positive image to withstand the negative, this can also 
be done by offering compensation.
79
 Corrective action means that the organisation will fix 
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the problem, this does not necessarily mean admitting to have caused the crisis.
80
 
Mortification means apologising for the act, it can include accepting the guilt (even if 
innocent) or trying to stay as vague as possible to admit the minimum amount of guilt.
81
 
The combination of these two close theories should offer the best means to determine the 
strategies used by the EC and give a structured overview that enables us to reach the 
conclusions about the impact of its crisis communication on reputation, image and 
legitimacy. The following table constructed for the purposes of this research illustrates the 
correlations between the two theories: 
 
Figure 2: Strategy correlations in theories of Benoit and Coombs
 
Table by author
82
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As we can see on the basis of the table minimization, differentiation and transcendence 
strategies by Benoit correspond to the strategies described under diminish category by 
Coombs, so do defeasibility, accident and good intentions strategies. Provocation by Benoit 
matches deny strategies. The only two strategies that have no clear equivalent by other 
author are victimage strategy by Coombs and corrective action by Benoit, first belongs 
among bolstering strategies and the second is a type of rebuild strategy. For the purposes 
of this research there is no differentiation made between primary and secondary strategies 
as Coombs does, because in case of political crisis bolstering seems to have bigger impact 
than being a mere addition to other strategies. 
 
As we can clearly see, the two theories are very closely connected, Coombs relies strongly 
on Benoit in his works, he shares the conviction that the communication has the ultimate 
power in shaping how the crisis and the organization in crisis are perceived by the 
stakeholders, and this in turn influences organization´s reputation and the attitudes of the 
stakeholders towards it and its actions in the future.
83
 Communication influences the 
emotions and reputation is affected by the emotions. The main difference between the two 
authors is the focus – Benoit is a descriptive theoretic who analyses crises cases and studies 
the strategies used, Coombs makes the missing practical connection between crises 
communication strategies and their predicted influence on the stakeholders. Benoit 
observes and interprets how organisations in crisis situation are acting, Coombs gives 
practical guidelines how the organisations should act to get the wished results. 
 
Both Coombs and Benoit are deeply influenced by attribution theory that in psychology 
seeks to understand how people construct the rationale behind the events, how they make 
sense of what is happening. Benoit acknowledges the importance of beliefs and values in 
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the communication acts that happen between a source and an audience, an organisation and 
a stakeholder.
84
 We have to keep in mind that: "Perceptions are more important than reality. 
The important point is not whether the business in fact is responsible for the offensive act, 
but whether the firm is thought to be responsible for it by the relevant audience."
85
 It means 
that the organisation is held responsible for crisis, because the stakeholders believe it to be 
accountable, the response to repair the image, the crises communication message, is created 
based on what the audience´s beliefs and values are thought to be like. It is all a 
guesswork
86
, and when these assumptions about the stakeholders are true, the 
communicative act, an attempt to convince or persuade the audience could be successful, it 
can change the attitude. Attitude consists of beliefs and values – facts and evaluations, the 
latter can be favourable or unfavourable, as two stakeholders can share the beliefs, but can 
have different values, it is necessary to know them in order to repair image by changing the 
attitudes of the audience.
87
 The responsibility (or blame) and offensiveness that we 
mentioned already above correspond to beliefs and values. Relying on theory of reasoned 
action by Fishbein and Ajzen, Benoit has 6 recommendations for improving an attitude to 
repair the image – strengthen beliefs and values associated with a favourable attitude and 
weaken the ones associated with unfavourable attitude; create a new or revive a forgotten 
favourable attitude.
88
 
 
The expected outcome of all the crisis communication strategies is the same – repair of the 
crisis-damaged image and reputation through changed the attitudes of the stakeholders 
towards the organisation in crisis, which also strongly contributes to legitimacy. For the 
purposes of this research, the following table presents a brief overview of all the strategies 
by Coombs and Benoit organised and grouped and gives a short explanation of the crisis 
situations they are used in and on what purpose. 
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Figure 3: Strategy type, its description and use 
 
STRATEGY TYPE SITUATION/CRISIS TYPE/PURPOSE 
 
Denial 
 
I did not do that. Used to fight the rumours and 
challenge crisis. The purpose is to remove the 
connection between organization and the crisis. 
 
 
Attack the accuser 
 
 
My accuser is a liar. Used, when there is an 
identifiable attacker in case of rumours or 
challenge crisis. Purpose is to reduce the 
credibility of the attacker 
 
 
Blame shifting, scapegoat, provocation 
 
 
It was him, not me or I did it only after you 
provoked me. Used to accuse someone else 
partly responsible for the crisis or for delays in 
measures taken. The purpose is to offer the 
stakeholders another target. 
 
 
Diminish or reducing offensiveness –  excuse, 
justification, defeasibility, accident, good 
intentions, minimization, differentiation, 
transcendence 
 
 
I did it, but it was not a big deal, because… or I 
did it for the greater good. The most diverse 
strategy group. Used by minimal damage and/or 
when the organisation has a little responsibility 
in crisis, otherwise not wise. The purpose is to 
make the crisis seem less severe or to show that 
the organization has no power over it. To  
 28 
 
 
 
Rebuild – compensation, apology or 
mortification, corrective action 
 
 
Because of what happened, I will offer you 
material or emotional compensation. Used to 
improve the organizations reputation by 
offering stakeholders reimbursement either on 
the material or immaterial level. The purpose is 
to offset the crisis by positive actions, 
communication. The best means to restore and 
increase the reputational capital. 
 
 
Bolstering – reminder, ingratiation, victimage 
 
Think of all the good I have done or I am a victim 
here too. Used by organisations with already 
strong reputation, suitable in every crisis type. 
Based on stressing the good traits of the 
organisation and or praising the stakeholder’s 
good work. Does no harm in any type of crisis, 
but not a good tool to build the reputational 
capital. 
 
Table by author, on the basis of Benoit and Coombs
89
 
 
The table above illustrates how the two theories complement each other, Benoit offering 
more explanations and theoretical background, Coombs concentrating on putting the 
theories into practice and making suggestions when which one to use. There are 
implications which strategy choice is wise or unwise in which situation in Benoit’s work as 
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well, these are more subtle, but his case studies have more information about political 
actors, whilst Coombs’ attention is mainly on business corporations. Thus combining the 
two theories gives the most complete frame for exploring the crisis communication of the 
EC, not the reasons for choosing the strategies, but the social consequences of them, the 
way, in which they shape reputation and/or legitimacy and if the strategies used increase 
them as it is the purpose of crisis communication. This typology of crisis communication 
strategies can consequently be used to analyse EC response to crises.  
 30 
 
2. European Commission and Communication 
 
The external communication of the EC is manifold and revolves tightly around President’s 
Cabinet (and the 10 political priorities). There are four closely connected departments i.e. 
Presidential Services that form the core of EC’s strategic planning and coordination of its 
work, including communication – Secretariat-General, Legal Service, Directorate General 
of Communication and European Political Strategy Centre. 
 
Secretariat-General is responsible for the communication during law-making process. It 
handles the interaction with national parliaments – on behalf of the EC it regularly sends 
the parliaments legislative proposals, green and white papers, communications, the annual 
legislative programme and other planning or policy documents
90
. The opinions of the 
parliaments and EC’s replies are both made public on a designated website.91Secretariat-
General is also responsible for the European Citizens’ Initiative, which allows EU citizens 
to participate in the development of EU policies – when an initiative gathers more than one 
million signatures, it suffices to call on EC to make a legislative proposal. Every successful 
initiative (4 so far) demands several communication act by the EC (a communication about 
further steps if taken, press releases, webpage explaining EC’s answer and follow up).92 
 
The European Political Strategy Center’s tasks involve among other activities reaching 
out to decision-makers, think tanks and civil society at large
93
. They organise public events 
e.g. conferences, publish a newsletter and in-depth analyses on different topic in diverse 
domains of interest for the President of the EC.
94
 
But the substantial part of EC’s external communication falls on Directorate General for 
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Communication (DG COMM). 
In 2016, the External Communication Network and the Internal Communication Network 
were merged into a Communication Network, co-chaired by the Directorate-General for 
Communication and the Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security. The two 
Directorates-General also co-chair the Corporate Communication Steering Committee which 
was established in 2016 as the high-level decision making body in communication.
95  
DG COMM is handling all the press activities (daily briefings, press conferences etc.), it is 
also responsible for the press releases database RAPID and EUROPA website, social media 
activities, Europe Direct networks, Visitors’ Centres, representations in Member States etc. 
DG consists of Spokespersons and four directorates, of which three are directly engaged in 
different domains of communication – strategy and corporate communications, 
representations in Member States and communication with citizens
96
. 
 
Besides media and public opinion surveys and analysis and overall communication 
management, including taking care of the corporate image, Directorate General’s overall 
responsibilities also are: 
•communicate to the media and public on 10 EC priorities and 36 connected topics 
•provide the Spokesperson’s Service – around 90 people that support the President and the 
Commissioners in their press activities in Brussels and in cooperation with representations 
in all EU countries.
97
 
 
The strategic plan of the department is public as are its annual work plans, activity reports, 
management plans and Europe Direct activity reports. In the working methods paper 
published in 2014, there is a following statement: "Communication can only be successful 
if the Commission speaks with one voice, reflecting the principle of collegiality. 
Communication should be oriented towards the political and strategic priorities of the 
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Commission."
98
 This speaking with one voice is achieved mainly by attributing the central 
coordinative role to Spokesperson’s Service that prepares Lines-To-Take on all portfolios 
(contributions from the DGs) and disseminates them through internal database for use on 
midday press briefing and interviews. 
 
In official documents of DG COMM the three directions of its services are defined, the 
external communication falling under the keyword engage: "Engage: As a communication 
service, the Directorate-General for Communication ensures that simple, clear and 
understandable messages focussed on the Commission's priorities are communicated to the 
media and other multipliers / stakeholders and to European citizens and engages with 
them."
99
 This corresponds to the main goal of the communication stressed in strategy and 
management documents, which is to bring the EU closer to citizens. But its is not as 
ambiguous as it sounds: 
Corporate communication thus contributes to the shared objective for external 
communication by building a better understanding by European citizens of the EU and its 
strategic priorities. With the 2016 – 2020 Strategic Plan and the Management Plan 2016, DG 
COMM’s overarching objective has now been mainstreamed to become the mandatory 
objective for external communication for all DGs, so it is now /…/ an objective domain, 
shared with the whole communication community across all DGs.
100
 
It can thus be seen that the communication of and in the EC is moving (and continues to 
move) towards bigger streamlining, in that sense becoming structurally even more similar 
to the other entities, institutions or organisations on which SCCT and image restoration 
theory are usually applied. 
 
Defining the purpose of the communication gets still more specific, when we take a look at 
the named Management Plan 2016, which states: "Citizens perceive that the EU is working 
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to improve their lives and engage with the EU. They feel that their concerns are taken into 
consideration in European decision making process and they know about their rights in the 
EU."
101
 So it can be said very simply that the main purpose of the EC’s communication is 
to convince citizens that EU exists for them, not above them or even worse despite them. 
Which leads us back to the inherent and always haunting legitimacy question (see Chapter 
1.1). 
 
As for "the communication community" of the EC – it is big. There are around 700 people 
besides DG COMM colleagues dealing with communication all over the EC. Every 
Commissioner’s Cabinet has its Communication Adviser. Every Directorate General has its 
own Communication Unit, guidelines and strategy papers defining their specific 
communication priorities for the year. Heads of Communication Units in DGs and DG 
COMM (including Heads of Representations and Spokesperson’s Service) form the 
Communication Network that coordinates and streamlines the external communication.
102
 It 
is evident that as far as it concerns the everyday communication, there is a well controlled 
and coordinated corporate communication machinery at place in the EC. There are targets 
and indicators set
103
 and very detailed, even comprehensive guidelines established on how 
to evaluate communication
104
. Everything is well envisaged, including the fact that the 
delivery of the aforementioned objective is dependant on two types of external factors: 
1) communication is connected to the actions it supports i.e. legislation and all other 
activities such as EU funding  
2) communication does not take place in a vacuum i.e. is influenced by 28 national public 
spaces and all the imaginable influences cast upon them in turn.
105
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All this arises the question about the crisis communication – the short description above 
gives a picture of the routine operation, but what rules are to be played by in case of crisis 
and who can play at all? There is one public document to be found that includes a chapter 
dedicated to handling crisis situations and crisis communication – a 2013 communication 
handbook for EU Agencies
106
. It is not much, but some aspects can clearly be noticed based 
on these guidelines: 
 they have been written by someone well familiar with the crisis communication 
theories 
 it stresses the need to coordinate with the Commission and use Spokespersons' 
Service
107
. 
It means that in case of practical crisis communication (agencies are dealing with practical 
matters and also the nature of the potential crisis is logically the same) there are quite 
simple rules to be followed and decentralised entity is accountable to principal, who 
supports and takes matters in its own hand if needed. 
 
EC itself rarely happens to find itself in any other kind of crisis situation that demands 
communication than the ones that are purely political or at least have strong political 
dimension, so there are no written rules to be found. No wonder – DG COMM exists for 
the President and the commissioners not the other way around and they are the only ones 
that have a mandate and power to speak during crisis. In the name of EU, the EC and 
themselves. Naturally there are teams behind all of them, both from DG COMM and their 
own cabinets, but they are there to support, provide the background and input, not to define 
the message. 
 
As a standard EC is verbally not very dynamic, usually the press releases about crisis 
management measures state dry facts and in the best case include a quote by the 
commissioner responsible for the policy field or by the President to make it less faceless 
and give an emotional touch that brings the message closer to the citizens. But as a crisis is 
                                                          
106
 Communication Handbook for the EU Agencies, December 2013, https://europa.eu/european-
union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/2013-12-10_communication_handbook_en.pdf  
107
 Ibid. 
 35 
 
a political situation, it demands the EC as a political actor to step up and assert itself, make 
statements and give explanations. It is expected by the public and the past has shown that it 
is the place, where the role and the persona of the President is fundamental e.g. Meyer 
states that the failed communication of Santer’s Commission was in part to blame on his 
personal and political weakness.
108
 
 
The President and also the Commissioners have the means and the responsibility to speak 
up. It is in its most visible form done through speeches that are the most personally inclined 
and elaborate texts we can find among the communication material EC makes public, most 
direct form of any kind of communication is a speech. Speeches do not deviate from the 
agreed general targets of the communication, but they say things more clearly, therefore 
have also the most direct influence on the reputation, it is so also with crisis 
communication, therefore it provides a very valuable material to study the phenomenon. 
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3. Methodology and research design 
 
In this chapter the materials used in this study will be introduced, the principles behind the 
choice of cases, primary and secondary corpus of texts explained and the research method 
applied to study them briefly presented. 
 
There are three recent and serious crisis chosen to be studied in this research: the Greek 
government-debt crisis as the most prominent representative of the Eurozone crisis, the 
migration crisis and Brexit. While there are differences among those three crisis, they 
arguably share the decisive characteristic for this study, that is they are affecting the very 
pillars of the European integration. The crises are different with respect to their nature -
while the former two are temporal in nature, the latter is structural. Yet, in terms of 
consequences, all three can be seen as having long-term consequences, allowing their study 
alongside each other. Moreover, they are different regarding (1) what they threated, (2) 
where they come from, (3) competences. The first, Greek crisis, threatened the existence of 
the Eurozone and Economic and Monetary Union the first brought with it more rigorous 
fiscal control on EU level and further integration of the internal market and the EMU. It is 
mainly externally caused and falls primarily under exclusive competence of the EU. The 
second, the migration crisis, threatened free movement of the people and Schengen area 
that besides practicalities has also a deep symbolic value and resulted in further integration 
and streamlining of migration policy, real cooperation between Member States in defending 
the external borders. It is also externally provoked, but falls under the shared competence. 
Finally, Brexit is affecting the EU as an entity, the nature of it, the core values, the belief 
that together the Member States can deliver better than separately – to which results this 
crisis will lead, is yet to be seen. It is internally caused and EU has the exclusive 
competence in the issue. But, fundamentally, all three of them are crises, fundamental 
crises, which require action by the organisation to respond, and which therefore renders 
them a viable object of study for exploring consequences of crisis communication strategies 
for reputation and legitimacy. 
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The methodological frames for analysis are derived from works of Norman Fairclough. 
Discourse analysis by Fairclough views the meaning of language, the creation and 
dissemination of language, discourse is a social practice, which corresponds to the whole 
process of social interaction such as text production and text consumption
109
 i.e. 
communication, including crisis communication. This means that within this framework, 
crisis communication and its social consequences can be studied. The texts are being 
studied applying Fairclough’s three-dimensional research framework (description-
interpretation-explanation). 
 
Figure 4: Three-dimensional framework in which discourse is constituted by text, its 
production and interpretation, and social context 
 
Source: Fairclough
110
 
 
Each of these stages are important to perform the discourse analysis of the material. 
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Fairclough’s method that combines "close textual and linguistic analysis within linguistics, 
the macrosociological tradition of analysing social practice in relation to social structures, 
and the interpretivist or microsociolgical tradition of seeing social practice as something 
which people actively produce and make sense of on the basis of shared commonsense 
procedures"
111
, seems even more suitable to achieve the aims of this thesis, when we take 
into account his reservations, that neither the production of the texts require necessarily the 
full awareness of these practices nor have they be and rarely are aware of the effects of the 
texts
112
. As we have already stated the possibility (in Chapter 1.2.) that the choice of the 
crisis communication strategy is not automatically a conscious act, Fairclough’s approach 
to discourse analysis is probably the most efficient tool to study the crisis communication 
of the EC based on the speeches described above and the social consequences of it, e. g. for 
reputation and legitimacy, connecting the discursive practice with the wider social practice. 
"For example, with respect to how objects, places, persons etc are represented in the 
premises of arguments, how choices in representation contribute to providing reasons for or 
against particular lines of action."
113
 
 
First the texts are being viewed and the findings presented, the speaker and the audience 
determined (also the possible sub- or supercategories of the recipient). Subsequently the 
findings are analysed in order to identify the type of crises (crisis clusters by Coombs 
discussed in Chapter 1.2.) and the type of crisis communication strategy used (based on 
theory combination of Benoit and Coombs introduced in Chapter 1.2), the choice of words 
and expressions is determined by the strategy applied and in turn, as a reverse effect, it is 
possible to detect, which strategy was used by the speaker, based on the in-depth analysis 
of the texts. After that the impact of the communication on reputation and legitimacy is 
established and the conclusions of the chapter on specific crisis drawn. The three 
dimensions of discourse analysis overlap and require moving back and fourth between 
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different stages of analysis,
114
 which benefits the whole process, making it more consistent 
and easier to follow. 
 
As there is no publicly available documentation on EC’s crisis communication strategies, 
the most immediate source for studying the phenomenon is the speeches (as also explained 
in Chapter 2). Even in case of press releases there are more intermediate links between the 
audience and the communicator (several producers of the text at different stages and media 
that also interprets a text) and they are most of the time anonymous, at the best case the 
name of a Directorate General is being mentioned. Speeches in the other hand are direct 
medium between the speaker and the audience, both the immediate receivers and the wider 
public, who can watch some speeches in real time, but later on read them all. In addition, as 
already stated in previous chapter the speeches are held by people, who have the mandate to 
speak in crisis situations. There are several stakeholders and audiences involved in all these 
crises. Member States and EU citizens, international actors, victims, organisations. While 
acknowledging that the primary audience is the one addressed in the speech, all the 
speeches are held for the whole EU, for the citizens, as they are published via RAPID and 
as corresponds with the objective of all the EC communication that is to involve the 
citizens (see Chapter 2). A more exact distinction by types of primary audience and by the 
speakers is given in the beginning of each chapter.  
 
Speeches analysed in this thesis are all obtained through RAPID (and EU Bookshop), that 
make available all the speeches held by Commissioners and the President. There is 
sometimes a disclaimer "check against delivery", therefore it has to be noted that the 
transcripts are not viewed in current research, only the official published texts. All the 
analysed texts are speeches even in written form, the genre is deliberately chosen and 
predetermined, confirmed also by the lexical density analysis (below 40%). Speeches were 
held on different purposes and in front of different audiences. The primary corpus of texts 
consists of 4 sets of speeches by the presidents of the EC, the Commissioners responsible 
for the crisis affected sector(s) and in one case the speeches of a neutral person working for 
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the EU are added – European Chief Negotiator. There are altogether 231 speeches analysed 
in this thesis, some are dedicated to crisis in question in relevant chapter, some only 
mention it, but what they say is as significant, there are: 75 speeches on Greek government-
debt crisis, 78 speeches on migration crisis and 78 speeches on Brexit and chosen for the 
case studies. In addition to the corpus of speeches, the study also draws on academic 
articles, book chapters on relevant topics to contextualize the findings. 
 
Whereas the primary corpus establishes EC crisis communication strategy, the study relies 
on secondary or supplementary corpus for the purpose of establishing social consequences 
of EC crisis communication. It does so on the basis Eurostat data and reports, 
Eurobarometer and other public opinion surveys, including the full reports, newspaper 
articles from reliable media sources. This data does not directly show the immediate effect 
of the crisis communication strategies, as no direct causal link is implied and it is 
acknowledged that other factors than crisis communication may have affected 
reputation/legitimacy. Nevertheless this data is still valid, not least since it reflects the 
reputation/legitimacy criteria the EC itself deploys in order to assess the effect of its 
everyday communication. 
 
Among the sources used for the background information or for evaluating the social 
consequences of crisis communication in relation with the legitimacy and reputation are 
public opinion surveys of Eurobarometer, from which various charts and data based on 
answers to different poll questions are being used. These are available as aggregated data 
through Eurobarometer Interactive. Among the questions for assessing 
reputation/legitimacy in this study are: 
1) In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, 
neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? 
2) Trust in European Commission  
3) Agreement with key policies of the EU 
4) (OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU. 
The first two questions are related to reputation, the second two to the legitimacy. 
 41 
 
Depending on the nature of the crisis, the consequences for reputation/legitimacy are 
measured either (migration crisis) with a view on EU population as a whole, or (Greek 
crisis, Brexit), with a view on the particular subgroup most affected. The focus on most 
affected helps extrapolating the consequences most clearly. The first question, as shown in 
Chapter 1.1., is being also used by DG COMM itself in measuring the success of the 
general communication activity of the EC. 
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4. Crisis Communication of the European Commission during Greek 
Government-Debt Crisis 
4.1 Crisis Communication 
 
In this chapter the first case study is performed, after placing the crisis into context, we are 
going to view the Geek government-debt crisis and EC crisis communication from 2010-
2017. In the second sub-chapter the impact of communication is being measured and some 
conclusions presented. 
 
The worldwide financial crisis that caused the European sovereign debt crisis affected all 
the Member States of the EU, the whole Eurozone, but most of all Greece. Greek 
government-debt crisis started to show late in 2009. Despite the earlier assurance that the 
measures have been taken and everything is under control with both excessive deficit
115
 and 
the statistics
116
, in its 2009 October news release on Euro area and EU27 government 
deficit Eurostat yet again adds a remark concerning 2008 data provided: "Eurostat has 
expressed a reservation on the data reported by Greece due to significant uncertainties over 
the figures notified by the Greek statistical authorities."
117
 In April 2010 Greece had no 
other solution available than to request financial assistance from its European and 
international partners.
118
 What followed is on lesser scale lasting up until now and we can 
say that we are dealing with a continuing crisis, this perception of course depending on the 
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point of view and how it is framed by media and EU or local institutions, however the fact 
remains that Greece has so far not exited its "adjustment programme"
119
.  
 
At least in November 2010 the main issue challenging the EU in the eyes of 69% of Greek 
citizens was indeed the economic situation: 
Figure 5: Most important issues facing the EU (Greek) 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
The same figure in the whole EU was even higher at 89%: 
Figure 6: Most important issues facing the EU (EU in general) 
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Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
These indicators are extraordinary, matching in their acuteness only the migration crisis yet 
to come. 
 
EC undoubtedly played an important role in managing that crisis – as one of the members 
of "troika" it was present in all the financial measures taken to avoid the total economical 
collapse of Greece and the whole Eurozone.  
In the case of the eurozone crisis in particular, however, there can be little doubt that if no EU 
agreement had been reached to aid crisis-stricken debtor states, the interest rates they would 
have had to pay on government bonds would have exploded and the eurozone would have 
collapsed either partially or completely.
120
 
Besides that concrete measure, all the legislative initiatives to tackle the general Eurozone 
crisis, to help the banks to recover, to avoid further damage and similar future scenarios 
were initiated by the EC. By 2014 EC had proposed nearly 30 sets of rules to ensure all 
financial actors, products and markets are appropriately regulated and efficiently 
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supervised. The rules form a basic framework for all Member States and support a properly 
functioning Single Market for financial services.
121
  
 
What EC has done, i.e. the crisis management measures, is well documented, recognized 
and visible. What the EC has said – the crisis communication – is maybe not so noticeable, 
although there are many reasons for it, and the lack of communication has played its part in 
legitimacy crisis at the time:  
However technically legitimate to the experts, a policy’s effectiveness and performance has 
to be judged according to the extent to which it resonates with citizen values, builds identity, 
and conforms to a community’s normative principles of distributive justice, fairness, or 
equity. Performance as judged by technical actors is insufficient on its own for legitimization. 
Outcomes also require a kind of ‘Weberian’ legitimacy, meaning that they must also resonate 
with citizens’ substantive values and principles, and are therefore perceived as acceptable and 
appropriate—and not just as matching citizens’ (technically established) interests.122 
Greece is the first and most extreme case of sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, in 
addition to the very obvious consequences, it also gave an enormous blow to EC’s own 
credibility and reputation as it represents the second level in the governance system of the 
common currency that despite of the problems detected already earlier failed to set better 
controls to guarantee that the first level of governance (national) could be trusted.
123
 From 
the perspective of the EC the Greek debt crisis could unquestionably be defined as a threat 
to reputation and therefore also to legitimacy (see the crisis definition in Chapter 1.1) of the 
whole EU as it was exposed that one of the major achievements of the integration project, 
the Economic and Monetary Union was not designed to function in the time of crisis. This 
kind of revelation causes damage and the credibility loss directly influences the way 
stakeholders interact with the institution. 
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The primary text corpus to analyse EC crisis communication strategies during the Greek 
government-debt crisis is divided into two: texts from the time of Barroso’s (second) 
Commission and from the period of Juncker’s Commission, altogether covering the time 
span from 2010-2017. The first group contains the speeches of EC president José Manuel 
Barroso (48 speeches from 2010-2014) and vice-President and commissioner responsible 
for economic and monetary affairs and the euro Olli Rehn (5 speeches from 2010-2012). 
Into the second group there are compiled the speeches of president Jean-Claude Juncker (13 
speeches from 2015-2017), commissioner responsible for economic and financial affairs, 
taxation and customs Pierre Moscovici (7 speeches from 2014-2017) and commissioner 
responsible for financial stability, financial services and capital markets union Jonathan Hill 
(1 speech from 2015). The speeches are all in various extents mentioning the Greek crisis. 
The texts are obtained via RAPID and from EU Bookstore (State of the Union addresses). 
 
Speeches were held on different purposes and in front of different audience. It is reasonable 
still to make the following broad division represented in the tables, because it plays a role 
in choice of the crisis communication tools: 
 
Figure 7: Speeches by Barroso's Commission 
Year Press conference Speech in Parliament Other 
2010 2 2+1R 1 
2011 5+1R 6+1R 2+1R 
2012 6 4+1R 1 
2013 1 1 3 
2014 3 4 8 
 
*+1R are speeches of Olli Rehn 
 
Figure 8: Speeches by Juncker’s Commission 
Year Press conference Speech in Parliament Other 
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2014 1M - - 
2015 3+1M 2 3+1H 
2016 - 1 3+1M 
2017 2M 1 2M 
 
*M stands for commissioner Moscovici, H for commissioner Hill 
 
As shown in Chapter 1.2 in SCCT Coombs distinguishes three crisis clusters: 1) victim 
cluster, 2) accidental cluster and 3) preventable cluster. Without going into too much detail, 
it can be determined that Greek debt crisis falls from the viewpoint of the EC at first under 
the first category, the victim cluster – the organisation is also the victim of the crisis, it 
involves weak attributions of crisis responsibility and therefore mild reputational threat.
124
 
In other words, objectively EC could not be blamed for the Greek crises, but it was greatly 
affected by it, victim through the potential damage to the Eurozone, one of the landmarks 
of the European integration project. As a "guardian of the treaties" it had to take action i.e. 
manage the crisis and communicate with the stakeholders. Later, as the crisis continues and 
escalates, EC has to defend itself against direct accusations from many stakeholders, the 
loudest of them of course the Greek:  
As EU leaders gather in Brussels to solve the Greek crisis, Athens and Brussels should share 
the blame for having let the country fall down its slippery slope. There are some 
responsibilities that fall onto Brussels. /…/ José Manuel Barroso, Joaquin Almunia and some 
of their other colleagues in the European Commission must at some point re-think what they 
and the large bureaucracy they oversee did wrong over these years to slowly push Greece [to] 
the present situation
125
. 
So in the end the crisis still falls in the accidental cluster, where the organisational actions 
leading to the crisis were unintentional and the reputational threat increases from minimal 
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to moderate.
126
 This is also supported by the shared responsibility in governing the 
common currency mentioned above: "Caught right in the middle of the changeover from 
the first to the second administrations of José Manuel Barroso, the Commission watched 
the early stages of the crisis with a mix of complacency and bewilderment."
127
 In the very 
beginning of the crisis in 2010 Barroso representing the EC is assertive, expresses his full 
support and solidarity, he assures that there is no doubt that Greece's needs will be met in 
time, he (as well as Olli Rehn) have word of condolences for the families of the victims of 
the violence in Athens, president says that EC is doing what is needed on all fronts. Greece 
is being assured that there are support packages ready and waiting and its reform plans and 
efforts acknowledged. These statements can be regarded the initial steps to answer the 
ethical responsibilities: "To be ethical, crisis managers must begin their efforts by using 
communication to address the physical and psychological concerns of the victims."
128
 
 
Also they indicate that the direction is taken towards the compensation strategy, one of 
the three rebuild strategies (see Figure 3). And also the ingratiation strategy is strongly 
present, that involves the stakeholders being praised: "Greek government has put forward a 
solid and credible package that will steer its economy on a sustainable path and restore 
confidence."
129
 
 
From 2011 onward it is already evident that the crisis is there to stay and Barroso states that 
the solution is not a sprint, but a marathon, more solidarity and cohesion in Europe is 
needed to cope with the crisis – more Europe and better Europe, europhobics and 
eurosceptics are making aggressive remarks, there is cacophony of criticisms, counter-
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criticisms, magic bullets and miracle panaceas. By discrediting the condemning parties and 
blaming them for escalating the crisis –attack the accuser strategy is taken.  
 
The compensation strategy giving the material and moral means for stakeholders to 
resolve the crisis is being continued: "Greece is, and will remain, a member of the euro 
area."
130
 Though, taking into account the shared responsibility, the help does not come 
entirely without reservations: "Greece must implement its commitments in full and on time. 
In turn, the other euro area members have pledged to support Greece and each other."
131
 
Olli Rehn stresses the need to be ready to adapt the crisis management tools to be credible 
and effective and that EC stands by Greece. Both of them give information on crisis 
response measures already taken and to be taken in the future – the corrective action. 
 
Later stages towards the end of the term of the Barroso’s Commission already show some 
optimism as some measures taken have shown results: "So don't tell me structural reform is 
unnecessary or unproductive"
132
, says Barroso in 2014. Also Greece is said to be is proudly 
assuming its role at the helm of the European Union. This indicates the use of bolstering 
strategies, both reminder of one´s good work and the ingratiation, the stakeholder is 
making efforts and is therefore earned the right to be proud. The compensation strategy is 
still running strongly. 
 
With the change of the Commission in the end of 2014 also the tonality of statements 
changes into more emotionally charged – due to the new President´s personal style and 
redefinition of EC´s mission to become a political one: "This crisis has also been a crisis of 
legitimacy – at all levels. Economic governance is not about legal rules or numerical 
percentages: it is about people and it is about political decisions that affect them. It is about 
political responsibility and political accountability."
133
 In the eve of Greek referendum on 
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bailout conditions the crisis has heated up again, Juncker is using in his speech in parallel to 
ingratiation (great Greek nation, Greek people are very close to my heart) attack the 
accuser and blame shifting strategies: "There is talk of an ultimatum, of a ‘take it or leave 
it' deal, of blackmail. But who is behaving like this? Who? Where are they coming from, 
these insults and threats, these misunderstandings and unfinished sentences which fuel the 
imagination of those who hear them and lead them astray?"
134
 Jonathan Hill, the 
commissioner responsible for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets 
Union is backing the President up in the speech held next day, saying that he was 
absolutely right to stress the need to offer a solution that satisfies also the expectations of 
the lenders. He also chooses to attack the accuser: "[…] it was the Greek Government 
who walked away from the table, who walked away from compromise."
135
 
 
On EU-China business summit in December 2015 Juncker is making the problems in 
Europe seem smaller: "I do not know how to apologise, but I had to do what I had to do this 
morning because we are trying to resolve what we call the Greek crisis in Europe and I had 
to spend some hours on that."
136
 This refers to applying the diminish or reducing 
offensiveness strategies. 
 
Later on, as the new crises emerge, the President dedicates himself more to them, the 
communication in Greek crisis is left on the shoulders of Commissioner Moscovici, who is 
responsible for economic and financial affairs. He is usually not talking about the Greek 
crisis separately or specifically, he is speaking about all the crises at hand and is therefore 
headed in the direction of comprehensive crisis communication acts and more general 
prospect. In 2016 he states that more political Europe with solid legitimacy is needed. 
Brussels is being blamed of being an elitist bubble. EU is getting further away from 
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citizens due to the lack of tools to use on all the levels (legislative, governance, working 
processes, democratic elections), which indicates defeasibility strategy. National 
governments, nation states are not willing enough to work together – this refers to the 
scapegoat strategy. But as a new trait an apologetic tone is appearing, the commissioner is 
acknowledging accountability towards citizens – vision and positive narrative is needed to 
tackle the general legitimacy deficit and actions. He recognizes that EU has let the people 
down – it is as close to apology or mortification as it can get in the case of the accidental 
crisis and proposes his vision for regaining the lost trust. In 2017 he assures that the Greek 
have done well, the Grexit danger has passed and envisages a "strong Greece in the heart of 
the eurozone."
137
 Hereby EC has returned to the ingratiation strategy. 
 
The analysis of the EC’s crisis communication in the Greek crisis shows that due to the 
changing nature of the crisis type from victim cluster to accidental cluster there is also a 
shift in strategies used. At first EC deploys compensation and ingratiation strategies, but 
as the crisis deepens and the responsibility is more strongly attributed, it turns to the mix of 
strategies from rebuild and bolstering families, combining it with the attack the accuser 
strategy sporadically, answering to the allegations of media and Member States. When the 
crisis enters the next phase, the diminish or reducing offensiveness strategy family enters 
the picture. Against this background, the next section is going to explore the consequences 
for reputation and legitimacy in Greek crisis. 
  
                                                          
137
 Moscovici, P. (2017) Speech by Commissioner Moscovici at the National and Kapodistrian University of 
Athens, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-286_en.htm  
 52 
 
4.2 Reception and the Evaluation of the Consequences for the Reputation 
and Legitimacy 
 
In the second subchapter of this case study, we will place the crisis communication into 
social context, we will study the reception and impact of the communication. To find out 
about the influence of the communication strategies determined in the first subchapter, the 
social consequences of this practice – i.e. the effect on reputation/legitimacy – needs to be 
brought into view. While having pointed out that the audience of the crisis communication 
are the citizens of the whole EU, the focus of this section is more narrowly confined to 
Greece as the most affected by the crisis and reputation/legitimacy loss or gain is most 
visible and relevant here. 
 
From one side Greek outright blame the EC and feel that their needs have not been met: 
"Furthermore, instead of contesting the IMF on its recent admission of errors on the Greek 
bailout as commissioner Olli Rehn did, Barroso should openly admit that mistakes were 
made and formally apologise to the Greek people. Only then can the commission move 
forward with credibility."
138
 It is a direct reference to the vast damage done on the 
organisation’s reputation and it is not a single voice saying it:  
[…] from 2010 (when the first MoU was signed) there is a drastic change in the image of the 
EU in Greece, with negative attitudes surpassing positive attitudes (and from 2011 surpassing 
also neutral attitudes) and displaying a constant upward trend, which peaked in 2013 at 54%. 
This means that for the first time in 2013, the majority of Greeks held a negative image of the 
EU.
139
 
It can be illustrated by the Eurobarometer charts reflecting the situation in November 2013 
– against the negative image perceived by 54% of Greek citizens, only 28% of the EU 
citizens in general share the same perception: 
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Figure 9: Image of the EU (EU aggregated, 
Greek) 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
But the damage is not irreparable and the situation altogether not completely hopeless as 
the belief in the legitimacy of the EU remains quite strong:"[…] Greek citizens do not 
reject the EU as a whole. […] a solid majority of Greeks (ranging between 54 -59%) 
believe that their country would not fare better outside the EU, while an even higher 
majority (ranging between 62-65%) support the monetary union and the common 
currency."
140
: 
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Figure 10: Greece could better face the future outside 
EU 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
General public is also not on favourable position, at least not in the early stages of the 
crisis: "Leaders have been heavily criticised, particularly by investors, for not taking 
decisive action to end the crisis."
141
 Later on the responsibility is being attributed more to 
the Greek government, but the EC is still not out of the woods: 
An Ipsos survey of citizens of nine European Union countries finds most people hold the 
Greek government responsible for the ongoing debt crisis. Some 88% say the Greek 
government is a great deal, or a fair amount, to blame for the crisis –rising to 94% among 
German respondents. The German government was mentioned by 46%, attracting less blame 
than the Greek populace, the IMF and the European Commission overall.
142
 
 
"During this period, anti-German stereotypes resurfaced in the Greek public sphere in 
parallel with increasingly mainstream Euroscepticism".
143
 The media analysis of the crisis 
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period reveals that behind the scepticism towards EU and the part Germany played, there 
can be found struggles between people and political elites on one side and the 
contradictions of different political ideologies on the other.
144
 
 
Indeed, the Greek parliamentary parties also engage in blame shifting. The two 
mainstream parties ND and PASOK, who have alternated their place as a governing party 
since 1974 before SYRIZA overpowered them in 2015, mostly blamed each other and the 
external actors, including EU. Three radical parties KKE, SYRIZA and LAOS blamed 
external actors/elites and mainstream parties for collaborating with them, SYRIZA being 
the most careful in negative attitudes towards the external elites as it sensed the possibility 
for taking power.
145
 
 
Soros in turn places the most blame for the unfavourable outcome on strong German 
influence in EU, that made the others go along with poor judgement:  
The European authorities under German leadership mishandled the Greek crisis. They started 
out by providing emergency loans to Greece at punitive interest rates; they imposed their own 
program of reform and micromanaged it instead of allowing Greece to take ownership and 
control of the reforms; and they always lent too little too late. The Greek authorities are far 
from blameless but the primary responsibility lies with Germany because it was in charge. 
The Greek national debt has become unsustainable but the European authorities are now 
unwilling to write down their loans to Greece.
146
 
 
Every actor involved in the Greek government-debt crisis is finding the other one partly or 
entirely responsible for the situation and this does not serve their reputation well. The trust 
in EC makes in Greece a rapid decline in 2009 and stays remains then almost stable at 20% 
from 2012 (EU average being much higher, remaining between 35-45%): 
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Figure 11: Trust in the European Commission 
(Greece) 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
Still, the support for actions taken at the supranational level i.e. the belief in legitimacy of 
the EMU and euro achieve a new high from the end of 2009, staying between 60-70% (EU 
average always being over 50%): 
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Figure 12: Are you for or against the European economic and monetary union with 
single currency, the euro (Greece)
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
What the above shows is that during the Greek crisis, the EC and EU suffered remarkable 
loss of reputation, legitimacy indicators on the other hand remain on the positive side. This 
means that while the crisis communication strategies deployed by the EC did not succeed in 
preventing reputational loss, they managed to contribute to maintenance of legitimacy. 
While no direct causal link can be established between EC crisis communication and 
up/down in reputation and legitimacy, the EC’s discursive interventions can still be seen as 
contributing to the conditions under which these changes in reputation/legitimacy became 
possible. 
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5. Analysis of EC crisis communication during the Migration Crisis 
5.1 Crisis Communication 
The migration crisis that hit the EU in the beginning of 2015, is in the scale and nature 
similar to the Eurozone crisis, affecting many different dimensions of integration project
147
, 
and again demanding the European countries to show the solidarity with the fellow EU 
Member States. 
According to Eurostat in 2015 1,2 million first time asylum seekers were registered in EU, 
the number that had more than doubled itself in comparison to the previous years figures
148
: 
Figure 13: First time asylum seekers 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Even though the migration crisis can be considered temporal by its nature as is the 
Eurozone and Greek government-debt crisis, both of them having come at least to the slow-
burning phase if not being entirely resolved, its impact on the EU and single market was 
significant. Migration crisis affected deeply one of the core elements of the single market – 
free movement of people and the Schengen system that makes this feature operational. This 
also contributed to the following crisis we will take a look at in the next chapter, the 
Brexit.
149
 In migration crisis the EU is perceived to have more accountability than in Greek 
crisis, first due to the background, EU has not been effective in its external politics to 
ensure the stability in its neighbourhood, and second the legislative means to deal with such 
an amount of immigrants were insufficient. Whilst the latter was brought up to date quite 
fast, the first is still lacking results. 
The migration crisis hit Europe with full force in 2015, but it started to unfold and show its 
signs already in 2014, that is the reason the speeches under analysis are from the time frame 
2014-2017. The corpus is formed of the speeches by President Juncker and by the 
Commissioner Avramopoulos, who is responsible for the migration, home affairs and 
citizenship. The broad division between the types of speeches to be viewed is the same as 
in previous chapter: 
Figure 14: Speeches by Juncker and Avramopoulos 
Year Press conference Speech in Parliament Other 
2014 2A 1A 2A 
2015 1+13A 4+2A 3 
2016 5+7A 2+4A 9+12A 
2017 1+2A 3  1+4A 
 
*A marks the speeches by Commissioner Avramopoulos 
 
When we take a look at the crisis clusters, this crisis is different, it is not without human 
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victims. The number of fatalities among refugees trying to cross Mediterranean during the 
crisis in 2014-2017 is roughly around 4400, the highest in 2015, when 1769 refugees lost 
their lives
150
. 
 
What complicates the nature of this crisis communication even more, is the fact that the 
victims – the refugees – themselves are not the primary target of the communication. The 
stakeholders are, Member States and citizens impacted by the flood of people trying to 
reach safety by any means. In the contrary to other crisis viewed in this thesis, from the 
very beginning EC acknowledges that it is partly responsible for the crisis or at least for the 
unhappy faith of many victims: "One of the reasons for so many lost lives is that it is too 
difficult for people seeking protection to enter the EU legally"
151
, states Commissioner 
Avramopoulos in the end of 2014. That places the crisis into immediately into the 
accidental cluster. EU recognises the role it has to play in the collective responsibility, 
even in blame that is equally attributed to EU, USA, NATO and other actors that have 
contributed to the instable environment in Middle East over the past years. Commissioner 
Avramopoulos says in reference to the Mediterranean Crisis as the crisis was called back 
then, that: "The EU as a whole must increase its commitment to the global resettlement 
efforts, and all Member States should contribute to that effort."
152
 
 
As the crisis starts to unfold in the end of 2014 Commissioner Avramopoulos expresses in 
his speeches the need for urgent action, working together, cooperation. In all the speeches 
he held during 2014, taking up his mandate as a commissioner, he is stressing the strong 
political will to deal with the highest migratory pressure since the Balkan crisis. 
Conveying this message continues until January 2015: "Europe has to take charge. We have 
no time to spare. Together, we will move forward with commitment and resolve."
153
 This 
all refers to precrisis measures taken, which is something new in case of the EC. Coombs 
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introduces in his works three-staged approach to the crisis management/communication – 
precrisis, crisis event and postcrisis
154
. Whilst in the case of Greek crisis there was no 
detectable precrisis action (at the same time EC was already dealing with the general 
financial crisis), in the case of migration crisis we can see the result of the risk assessment, 
there is a potential and imminent threat seen in migration sector that demands attention, 
action and preparation.  
 
And the crisis was well predicted (after Lampedusa
155
 and regarding the continuously 
growing pressure on external borders it was not too hard) and from the 2015 the actual 
crisis communication starts. In January 2015, after more major refugee ship tragedies
156
 
Commissioner Avramopoulos expresses deep sorrow and compassion for the victims, and 
declares a war on smugglers. He is combining corrective action (rebuild strategy) with 
concern for the victims, that Coombs does not include as a separate strategy, but mentions 
as adjusting information that should form the part of the initial crisis response.
157
 In April 
President Juncker declares that our response has been inadequate, from the middle of the 
speech it is evident that the us is only the European Council, whose actions are not 
ambitious enough. He is distancing him and the EC. He also says that the claims about the 
limitations of Frontex mandate are not true, referring to the excuses made not to operate in 
international waters. There is the lack of general will to do so. Juncker is personal and 
emotional: "To be honest, I have had enough of poetry. I find the rhetoric of concern 
attractive at first but not all the time."
158
 As he is urging towards more constructive action 
he is using corrective action of rebuild strategy family, which is mixed with blame 
shifting and attack the accuser strategies (statements made by the other actor are not true) 
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– EC is ready to take the decisive steps, but the Council (and Member States) do not have 
enough shared solidarity, which also combines elements of excuse strategy, belonging to 
the family of diminish or reduce offensiveness strategies. 
 
This rhetoric is continued by Commissioner Avramopoulos, who is very assertive in speech 
held before Parliament: "It was time for the European Commission to fulfil its fundamental 
role as the engine of European integration, taking action on the big challenges of our 
times."
159
 He is talking about realistic Agenda with concrete measures to be achieved by 
shared effort. So we can see the rebuild strategies strongly ongoing. Victimage and 
ingratiation strategies kick in, when appropriate and where the immediate audience is 
more involved in crisis e.g. speech on the island of Kos, where the Commissioner assures 
that EC is not faceless bureaucratic and administrative machine, but consists of real 
people, who are also hurt, when seeing shipwrecks and drowning children broadcasted. He 
continues praising the islanders for being very hospitable therefore creating one of the most 
inviting destinations. He says it is something the residents of Kos can be proud of. This 
strategic line goes on while visiting Austria, where he can only praise the country for its 
relentless efforts, while also thanking neighbouring Germany (later, in speech held in 
Germany, he specifies that the German approach is an embodiment of the European spirit). 
Interestingly he uses much of the exact same expressions he did in Greece e.g. "[…] the 
refugee crisis is not just Austrian, Hungarian, Greek, Italian, or German. It’s a European 
crisis."
160
 He is only varying the succession of the countries in the sentence, it could be 
intentional, to stress the message, but could also be the sign of pressure under which the 
Commissioner and his speechwriters are. The same thought sounds also in Zagreb, 
Ljubljana, accompanied by thanking Croatia and Slovenia. All this work is done in the 
name of the European Agenda on Migration (corrective action strategy), including its most 
controversial measure – the relocation scheme161 based on "quota system". 
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In State of the Union speech in 2015 President Juncker is again using attack the accuser 
strategy: "There has been a lot finger pointing in the past weeks. […] And more often than 
not fingers have been pointed from national capitals towards Brussels.[…] We could all be 
angry about this blame-game. But I wonder who that would serve."
162
 By accusing the 
Member States of blame shifting, the open critique used as a weapon to reduce the 
responsibility of the EC. 
 
The same combination of strategies are being used by the President and the Commissioner 
throughout the 2016 as well, only there is a noticeable shift towards the attack the accuser 
and blame shifting strategies. Avramopoulos in March: "Closing borders, playing the 
blame game and taking distance from the problem are obviously not the solutions."
163
 In 
April he repeatedly stresses that fragmentation makes us vulnerable, he is urging for 
solidarity and responsibility, bringing in the legal obligation imposed by Treaties and 
warning that otherwise there are dire consequences to be faced. In June he states that 
Member States should speed up their efforts. In September he recognizes there has been 
some success achieved and results delivered, but yet again feels the need to stress that 
solidarity is not only moral responsibility, but legal responsibility enshrined in the EU 
treaties. All Member States must make the effort – we have to remember, it is the time 
shortly before the Hungarian quota referendum
164
. By December the Commissioner sees the 
situation calming, still reiterating his message throughout the year: "But, let me also repeat 
once again that no single Member State should be shouldering such responsibilities 
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alone."
165
 And he returns to the excuse strategy regarding the Dublin transfers
166
, saying it 
is not the decision up to EC. 
 
While in State of the Union speech President Juncker acknowledges that the EU has started 
to see solidarity, he says, that more is needed and it must come from the heart, it cannot be 
forced. He is plain and straightforward also in his speech held in October, making parallels 
between the Eurozone and the refugee crisis: "In both cases, the crisis revealed that our 
integration was incomplete. […] In critical areas, the rules were still national."167 He also 
states that the EU acted as a crisis manager and stresses its central role in finding solutions 
where solidarity was missing. He is using a mixture of blame shifting strategy, and excuse 
strategy that constitutes of minimising the responsibility.  
 
Ingratiation strategy that is scarcely used in case of EU Member States, moves towards 
external partners as the scope of crisis widens and need for partners is clear, Commissioner 
Avramopoulos: "I have said before that Turkey is a partner of the EU, and that the EU is a 
partner of Turkey."
168
 He states that Turkey has made impressive progress. 
 
In 2017, when the crisis had lost its urgency, the President is recognising that the initiatives 
related to migration and the refugee crisis of the Maltese presidency are totally in line with 
the intentions of the EC and adds that Malta is a small country with great ambitions. Yet 
again, in May he reminds once again the importance of solidarity, a virtue in need to be 
rediscovered. In May Commissioner Avramopoulos states the need to move forward from 
the crisis-modus, and by noting that the difference between now and just two years ago, is 
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like night and day, and that EU has achieved more in the past two years than what was 
possible in the twenty before it in September, we can see that the crisis is counted resolved 
from the side of the EC by using ingratiation and reminder strategies. 
 
The EC’s crisis communication strategy during the migration crisis can be seen to mostly 
relying on corrective action, blame shifting, attack the accuser, excuse and ingratiation 
strategies. Excuse and blame shifting were being used during periods, when corrective 
action was missing the impetus, ingratiation was used on motivational purposes. In the 
following, the consequences for reputation/legitimacy of these crisis communication 
strategy will be looked into. 
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5.2 Reception and the Evaluation of the Consequences for Reputation and 
Legitimacy 
 
Besides the temporal nature of the crisis, there is one other feature connecting the migration 
crisis to the Eurozone crisis, this is the great difference of views between Member States 
and an unbalanced power position and influence of one Member State in particular – 
Germany.
169
 To complicate things further, whilst monetary policy in euro countries belong 
among the exclusive competencies of the EU and it could take at least some of the 
measures to tackle problems more easily, migration crisis affects several fields, none of 
them an exclusive competence of the Union. 
 
As there were unprecedentedly many fatalities during the crisis and it was easy to engage 
the public concentrating on them, media played a great role in conveying a very 
monochrome picture of the whole migration crisis, framing it by using strong imagery and 
populist political rhetoric:  
Journalists have adopted ways of reporting that are not always conducive to 
sophisticated analysis, resorting to sensationalism in order to package and present the 
“refugee crisis” in a way people can readily understand and consume. The mere 
visibility of some facets of migration, such as boatloads of people cramming a tiny 
and barren island, have all the elements of newsworthiness that ongoing, massive 
socio-political, economic, and demographic changes do not. When time and material 
resources are limited, journalist visits are fleeting and their focus is on harvesting 
images of shipwrecked dinghies if and when a tragedy occurs.
170
 
The media has been repeatedly blamed for failure to portray the refugees as human beings 
with lives that are worth sharing, media has been accused of failing their responsibility to 
present the refugees acting with us in the world instead of creating an image of voiceless 
mass, who is been acted upon.
171
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Similarly the measures taken and solicited by the EC were not very attractive nor 
potentially well selling in the eyes of news media. This all played a role in how the EC 
crisis communication was received. Only the most controversial of the Migration Agenda 
measures – the relocation quotas – got wide media coverage in all Member States. This 
visibility was (and is) in several Member States used as a political leverage to boost support 
for right-wing anti-migrant politics (most prominently in Hungary, Slovakia, Czech 
Republic and Poland),
172
 but it suspectedly also deepened euroscepticism in United 
Kingdom, playing its part in Brexit vote results
173
. 
 
The main message of EC crisis communication during migrant crisis – more solidarity is 
needed – seems to have failed even after the formal victory in the European Court of 
Justice, the migration policy is headed towards better protection of external borders and 
placing the problem outside of EU.
174
 
 
On the other hand, in the beginning of crisis 34,9% of citizens tend to trust and 45,7% tend 
not to trust the EC, the institution´s reputation is low, it is the second historic low point 
since the question features on Eurobarometer, it was lower only in May 2014, when the 
trust indicator was at 32,4% (which might be attributed to the heated situation in Ukraine): 
 
Figure 16: Trust in the European Commission 11/2015 
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Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
By the end of 2017 the trust in EC had regained its usual level at 42,2 %, growing by 10% 
during that period: 
 
Figure 17: Trust in the European Commission 11/2017 
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The fluctuation in trust level (that is in correlation with reputation) can be explained by the 
crisis itself and the measures, including crisis communication measures, taken to answer it, 
the latter repairing the reputation and increasing the trust in the institution. The relationship 
between public opinion and the negative influence of crisis periods has been established.
175
 
In a study dedicated to the immigration and public opinion in EU, it has been pointed out 
that the attitudes towards immigration itself are highly contrasting, being most negative in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where reluctance towards actions of solidarity is evident, but it 
is also noted, that this division does not coincide with the with the differences between 
positive and negative attitudes on the EU
176
.  
 
There could be a conclusion drawn that even if the concrete measures and crisis 
communication have a different reception throughout the EU, causing the decline in 
positive perception of the EU (and EC), there is no doubt in legitimacy of EU level actions 
and the necessity of the institution itself. The following two figures illustrate this quite 
well, the support for the common action in migration issue is extremely high, staying at 
around 70% throughout the crisis: 
 
Figure 18: Are you for or against the common European policy on migration (EU) 
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Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
Comparing it with the data from Hungary, that has one of the most hostile immigration 
attitudes in EU, we can see that the support rate is lower, declining from 70% in 2015, but 
still staying around 50% (e.g. the contribution of immigrants is deemed positive only by 
14% of Hungarians): 
 
Figure 19: Are you for or against the common European policy on migration 
(Hungary) 
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Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
 
Given the strategies the EC deployed in this crisis, the outcome reflects, that while the 
reputational loss occurred, it was diminished by use of suitable strategies at appropriate 
occasions. The communication on corrective actions was strong this time, it contributed to 
the acceptance of EC approach on all levels, citizen´s support to common action in that 
policy field is strong. Against this background, we can conclude that in this crisis that the 
legitimacy of the EC and EU is not harmed. Once again, while no causal inference can be 
made, this still depicts the social consequences which unfolded against the background of 
the discursive intervention – crisis communication of the EC. 
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6. Analysis of EC crisis communication around and after the Brexit 
referendum 
6.1  Crisis Communication 
This chapter is dedicated to the third case study – similar to the others, the contextual frame 
for the crisis is offered and then the analysis of the speeches performed. The second part of 
the chapter will measure the impact of the crisis communication strategies used. 
 
The United Kingdom has always been unlike the rest of the EU, be it due to historic 
baggage of once being the biggest empire in the world or because of clearly different 
economic and trade interests that had to be protected, its special relationship with the 
United States or all of these reasons and more, the fact is that UK has the most opt-outs 
from EU legislation.
177
 
 
The differences in public opinion also illustrate this distinctiveness, when we take a look at 
the surveys: 
Figure 9: I feel safer in EU (UK)  
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Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
As opposed to EU average during the same period: 
Figure 10: I feel safer in EU (EU in general)  
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
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The same convinced opposition is also seen towards the economic benefits EU has to offer: 
Figure 11: I feel, my country is economically stable in EU (UK)  
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
We can see that neither the security nor the economic reasons to belong to the EU have 
made their way deep into the hearts of British EU citizens. Looking at the history and the 
UK-centred communication and public sphere of the country, it is not surprising. 
 
Still, when UK voted to leave the EU by 52% to 48% on the referendum held on 23 June 
2016
178
 it was an unexpected outcome of a political game
179
 that regardless of many 
speculations is impossible to turn back
180
. On 29 March 2017, in accordance with the 
Article 50 of the EU, the United Kingdom notified European Council of their intention to 
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leave the EU and on 29 April the negotiation guidelines were adopted. The EC is 
coordinating the work on all the issues involved in the process.
181
  
 
Brexit is said to be affecting mainly the territorial borders of the European integration, it is 
a domestically induced crisis
 182
, with smaller scope than the Eurozone and migration crisis, 
not so multi-dimensional, but it has a deep impact on reputation and legitimacy of the EU, 
showing clearly the difference between the will of political elites and the general public. It 
is a structural crisis that affects the pillars of the European integration, questions the will 
and ability for much needed solidarity and might result in being the first step in 
disintegration of the EU.
183
 When we look at the crisis clusters, for the EU it falls under the 
victim cluster, where the responsibility attribution is low and the reputational threat is 
considered low. This combined with the fact that negotiating the terms of UK leaving and 
possibly concluding the new international agreements with it, belong under the exclusive 
competence of the EU, gives the EC quite free position in its crisis communication. 
 
The time span of the speeches analysed in this chapter is 2016-2018. The speakers are the 
President of the Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, commissioner in charge of in charge of 
financial stability, financial services and Capital Markets Union and the EU high negotiator 
Michel Barnier, European Chief Negotiator for the United Kingdom Exiting the EU. 
Figure 12: Speeches by Juncker, Dombrovskis and Barnier 
Year Press conference Speech in Parliament Other 
2016 1 2 5 
2017 4+2D+7B 7+4B 5+4D+16B 
2018 4B 3+1B 3D+3B 
 
*D marks the speeches of Commissioner Dombrovskis, B the speeches of Chief Negotiator Barnier 
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In 2016, before the vote was taken, Juncker is approaching the issue with humour – at first 
he is talking about the contagious referenda (also referring to the Hungarian one on quotas), 
making jokes that the UK referendum can not possibly go badly as it takes place on the 
National Holiday of Luxembourg. Then he turns to pure irony: "The Commission is even 
more unpopular in the UK than in other countries, and it is quite an achievement to be 
unpopular in the UK."
184
 On the other hand he already states that there will be no 
renegotiation with the British: "Not just because the Prime Minister voted against me as 
Commission President, but also because this time he was extremely glad we were able to 
help him sort out his problem, a problem of his own making."
185
 We can observe the use of 
diminish or reducing offensiveness crisis communication strategies here, minimization 
and excuse as he is making the crisis look less severe and also showing that EC has no 
power over nor responsibility for it. Also there is a quite strong blame shifting strategy in 
use that becomes especially clear as he concludes his speech with following: "Those who 
do not believe in Europe, doubt it, or are exasperated by it should visit the graves of our 
wars."
186
 
 
Shortly after the referendum the ironic position of the President does not disappear, 
referring to the resignation of the Brexit architects, he says: "I would have thought that they 
had a plan. Instead of developing a plan, they are leaving the boat."
187
 On several occasions 
he is reiterating that the free access to the internal market includes playing by all the rules, 
provocation strategy is used – we are only reacting. 
 
In 2017 also other speakers appear from the side of the EC. Commissioner Dombrovskis is 
stressing that the integration is an existential question for the financial markets despite one 
leaving country. He says that in Brexit question EU will act as one to preserve its interest 
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and the goal for the future is to have a fruitful cooperation with UK on fair terms. He states 
that the resilient economic base is needed to successfully cope with Brexit and its potential 
impact. The commissioner is communicating using the corrective action strategy. 
 
A third voice has been given mandate to speak in this crisis – Chief Negotiator Barnier. He 
is not a member of the Commission, he is chosen to perform his duties as a impartial 
outsider, but we must not forget that he was Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services in second Barroso Commission
188
, so he is very well aware of the communicative 
tasks expected. In speeches in front of the Parliament he is expressing the need for unity 
from the EU side, unity, which does not fall from the sky, but is earned by transparency, 
public debate and trust. Barnier is fighting the populist allegations made during a plenary 
session in October: "[…] never, ever will you find the slightest bit of revenge or 
punishment in my attitude – never!"189 and he also is firmly reasoning against using the 
word ransom, while describing the financial conditions of exit. He is using provocation 
strategy here as if saying: If you would not have wanted to leave, you would not have to 
pay, what is due. As for the negotiations, he stresses in his speeches the positive 
atmosphere, the need to build trust, the need for clarity. By the end of September Barnier is 
saying that constructive spirit has been expressed and new dynamic has been created in the 
negotiations, but stresses that there still is not a sufficient progress. And he is constantly, in 
every speech repeating that the time is passing very quickly, implying that the UK side has 
not been and still is not constructive and cooperative enough. He is using reminder, blame 
shifting, ingratiation and corrective action strategies. 
 
In State of the Union speech 2017 President Juncker says: "This will be both a sad and 
tragic moment. We will always regret it. But we have to respect the will of the British 
people. We will advance, we must advance because Brexit is not everything. Because 
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Brexit is not the future of Europe."
190
 He is making his position clear – even though Brexit 
is an important issue, it is not in the top of the list. Juncker is still using diminish or reduce 
offensiveness strategies. In December 2017, after the Joint Report of negotiators was 
agreed and the first phase of negotiations concluded, President Juncker admits that 
sufficient progress has now been made, which is later clarified by Barnier not to be taken 
for a full progress. 
 
The beginning of 2018 meets us with the same strategy lines. Provocation and blame 
shifting by Barnier (this was the UK's sovereign decision; we regret the decision but we 
respect it and now we have to implement it), as he is firmly saying no transition period can 
be sure before the ratification of withdrawal agreement and no special treatment will apply. 
Dombrovskis is stressing the need to strengthen pre-conditions for the true single market, 
meaning through corrective action (including strengthening the monetary union) the 
impact to the economy will be withstood. And President Juncker says there is no winning 
side in Brexit and that EU is not throwing UK out. He also says: "We need to focus on our 
European future – not on the past, and not on Brexit."191 He is still using the diminish 
strategies. 
 
On the basis of the analysis above, we can note, that the most commonly used strategies in 
this crisis are diminish or reducing offensiveness family strategies, also blame shifting 
and corrective action. In the following subchapter their social consequences are being 
viewed. 
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6.2 Reception and the Evaluation of the Consequences for Reputation and 
Legitimacy 
Given the exclusive competence in the matter and the weak attribution of responsibility in 
this crisis, the position of the EC was strong, reputationally at least. The crisis 
communication itself, though, was complicated by several external factors. 
The British media (as well as the society) was divided already before the Brexit vote, but 
this impartial versus eurosceptic attitude in UK's media coverage is nothing new. Before, 
during and after the Brexit the most reliable and neutral message was distributed by BBC, 
but even they were accused of failing to achieve actual balanced impartiality before the 
vote and politicising everything.
192
 Trying to give word to every side (government, Irish, 
Scottish, EU) while answering the widespread provocative articles in tabloid media (e.g. 
Daily Mail, The Sun)
193
 is not an easy task and therefore the EU crisis communication did 
not have reliable nor neutral enough means to spread in UK. It was (justifiably) presented 
in national context e.g. the pre-Brexit speech by the President (Juncker´s suggestion for 
eurosceptics to visit the graves of our wars) was even in the mainstream news reproduced 
with the angry response by the "out" campaigners,
194
 whilst in the other media the strong 
colours were not held back at all
195
. Later, as the Briton´s frustration towards their own 
government grows, we can see this approach fade even in tabloids and more balanced 
picture is presented
196
. 
After the initial predominantly negative reaction to the Brexit referendum result
197
, the 
media and general public in Member States developed a mostly neutral standpoint. The 
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news media in EU was covering Brexit extensively, but without strong emotions. Most of 
the news were the matter of fact statements on the progress of the negotiations or analytical 
articles speculating on the future scenarios of EU-UK relations. If something, the British 
government and the Prime Minister are pictured in a slightly ironic key
198
 and sometimes 
stories are published about the EU citizens´ mistreatment in UK
199
.  
On more fundamental level, if we recognise the permanence of the Brexit decision and its 
historic relevance in the history of the European integration – there are some major issues 
connected to Brexit, though, for example will Brexit become contagious? The reply might 
include the comparison of the crisis management and the crisis communication of both the 
UK and the EU: "The answer to the latter question may depend heavily on how well the 
UK is perceived by citizens in other member states to manage any post-referendum crises 
compared with how well the EU manages its other crises."
200
 
Brexit is still very much an ongoing crisis, the negotiations are only half way through and 
the transition period has been agreed in principle. Nevertheless, we can see that the most 
prominent feature of EC´s crisis communication in this crisis is – consistency. They use the 
same strategies and they hold the same position all through the crisis. 
It seems to be a rewarding approach. Even if the image of the EU is not the most positive in 
the UK during the crisis (but the EU average is only around 5-10% better during the period 
in question), it shows improvement and the positive attitudes are by the end of 2017 
slightly prevailing: 
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Figure 15: Image of the EU (UK) 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
The support level to one of the key policies of the EU, one of the pillars of the Single 
Market, that Britons voted to leave, is a bit lower than the EU average (around 80% 
throughout the period in question), but still remarkably high and shows growing trend:  
Figure 13: Free movement of 
people 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
The UK citizens' view on UK´s brighter future outside the EU is pessimistic and 55-60% of 
people do not think UK could do better not being part of the EU: 
Figure 14: Could UK better face the future outside the EU? 
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Source: Eurobarometer Interactive 
This means that with in the context of Brexit, EU reputation has not suffered during the 
Brexit crisis, the EU image as an indicator in UK being in correlation with the EU average 
and in general higher than ever since 2000, when the question was first included in the 
Eurobarometer survey. Legitimacy of the EU itself and one of its key policies – free 
movement of people – that is also one of the major issues preventing the successful 
conclusion of Brexit negotiations seems to be unquestioned even in the eyes of UK citizens. 
Against the background of the previously established EC crisis communication strategy, 
this means that EC was successful in maintaining/repairing reputation and the legitimacy 
has not suffered. 
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Conclusion 
 
In terms of crisis communication, the EC was found to rely on compensation and 
ingratiation strategies in the beginning of Greek government-debt crisis, later it continues 
to use other strategies from rebuild and bolstering strategy families, which are combined 
with the attack the accuser strategy at times and diminish or reducing offensiveness 
strategy family. The multitude of strategies used can be explained by the alteration of the 
crisis cluster from victim to accidental, the latter having stronger responsibility attributed 
to the EC and also the long time span of the crisis that includes both fast and slow burning 
phases. In terms of social consequences there can be seen a serious damage to the 
reputation, which means that the strategies chosen did not work well for 
maintaining/repairing the reputation. Legitimacy in the other hand suffered less, it can be 
contributed to the prior very strong reputational capital (see Figure 1). The main problem 
might in this case be that the corrective action was taken, EC had the means to do so 
(mostly exclusive competence policy field, only the bail-out measures had to be agreed 
upon), but it was not communicated clearly enough through the corrective action strategy. 
The strategies used could have worked for repairing the image, but they were used 
inadequately, e.g. instead of answering the allegations of Member States and media by 
using the rebuild strategies, attack the accuser strategy was chosen, which according to 
SCCT might have been effective, when the accusations would have been invented, based 
on rumours. By the incident of Greek referendum attack the accuser and ingratiation 
strategies were used, these might have worked better, if the balance would have been right 
– more towards the ingratiation. 
 
In the migration crisis the most often deployed strategies by EC were corrective action, 
blame shifting, attack the accuser, excuse and ingratiation strategies. Excuse and blame 
shifting strategies were being used logically, during times, when corrective action, which 
in this case was communicated much better than during the Greek crisis, was slowed down, 
it was used in parallel with ingratiation to encourage the Member States agree on further 
steps. The shared competence limited in part the choice of strategies, but in the other hand 
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demanded continuous communication, that was lacking during the Greek crisis. In the 
migration crisis the social consequences from the aspects of reputation and legitimacy are 
better – reputation indicators initially dropped, but were improved by the time the crisis 
calmed down. Legitimacy did not suffer too much even in these Member States that on the 
elite level were most hostile towards the common migration policy. On the basis of the 
CDA we can not make the direct link between image repair, reputation restoration and the 
crisis communication, but at least it can be seen to contribute to the process. 
 
The Brexit crisis saw EC using the diminish or reducing offensiveness family strategies, 
also blame shifting and corrective action. There are much less strategies used than in 
other two crises studied. As EC´s position in this crisis is clean cut, it is a victim cluster 
crisis and the matters belong under exclusive competence of the EU, it is easier to be 
consistent in the strategy choices and the use of strategies. Also, the provocation strategy 
is used as a novelty feature, which is more elegant and convincing than simple blame 
shifting. This also indicates that the crisis communication strategies are used more 
confidently and consciously than in previous crises. As the social consequences neither the 
reputation nor legitimacy suffered during the time of Brexit crisis until to the date it was 
viewed. 
 
This study started with the aim to know what kind of crisis communication strategies EC 
uses and that we could find out. We also wanted to see if there are the social consequences 
of the use of these strategies that could be connected to reputation and legitimacy of the 
EU. While this study focussed on assessing the consequences of EC crisis communication 
strategy by looking at media response and public opinion, it acknowledges that a) other 
factors than EC crisis communication could have played a role, b) it could not take into 
account all different audiences in detail, but instead focussed on the most relevant for each 
crisis/case. Nevertheless, and in the spirit of the discursive framework this study has 
adopted, interested in conditions of possibility, not causal connections, the findings still 
suggest that crisis communication contributes to shaping the context within which the 
observed consequence regarding reputation/legitimacy can occur. 
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All these findings have to be understood within the parameters - and limitations - of the 
present study. The position of the EC as a communicator is complicated. EC speaks to the 
vast and diverse audience through the crisis communication, there are many different 
stakeholders, whose stages of involvement in the crisis vary on a big scale. The multiple 
audiences and their diverse positions is nothing new, it has also been noted by the crisis 
communication experts: "[…] the audiences are not monolithic; for example some may 
think that a crisis is internally caused, whereas others may think it is externally caused."
201
 
The same applies also to how severe is the crisis in the eyes of the stakeholders and which 
direct points of involvement it has with their lives e.g. the migration crisis is obviously 
differently perceived by Greek and Hungarians than by Finnish and Swedish citizens. That 
is why at times the most affected audience is chosen to illustrate the social consequences. 
 
The position of the EC is further complicated by being a supranational actor that depending 
on the policy field has its hands tied or is free to act, it is determined by the competencies it 
has regarding the policy – exclusive or shared. This is one of the features that decides, 
which crisis management measures and which crisis communication strategies are used. 
The expectations in the other hand and are always bigger than the means to deliver the 
longed results. 
 
Whilst the capability-expectations gap
202
 appeared in public consciousness in connection 
with the international role of the EU (i.e. EU’s inability to act up to the expectations of the 
international community during conflicts in Balkans and North Africa in the end of the 
century/beginning of the new one), the political legitimacy crisis that has followed different 
crises in past ten years is more of internal nature, partly given from the above mentioned 
fact that anticipations and reality are not completely corresponding: "Were it a federation, 
which it is not, then clearly it would be performing badly. But if the EU is understood as 
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confederation, then its link between its institutions and its citizens are unusually strong".
203
 
 
That there is a mixture of strategies used in all the cases, it is nothing unusual: "[…] in 
some cases there is no single crisis type, and no single appropriate defensive strategy can be 
identified in a particular situation."
204
 Still, it can be said that EC can not use the "strong" 
crisis communication strategies like full apology or full denial – it all depends on the 
responsibility attributed to it, at least in three crises viewed in this thesis it is either two big 
or two small. EC is never entirely without blame and never fully guilty, no matter the 
audience and some populist claims. Also, EC has to adapt its crisis communication 
strategies to keep up with the evolution of the crisis and the different phases of it. What 
matters is that the right combination of strategies is chosen, appropriate to the given 
circumstances. As we can see on the basis of the findings, at times EC has managed to do 
that. 
 
One more aspect has to be pointed out, the consistency in the strategies used might have 
an influence on their effectiveness. EC crisis communication was most successful during 
Brexit, having positive influence on both the reputation and legitimacy. The practical 
outcome of this crisis is still unknown, but as it is not excluded that it could be an 
opportunity for further integration: "All of the crises are open-ended: they may result in 
disintegration but also lead to a reassertion of the status quo or to more integration."
205
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EUROOPA LIIDU KOMMUNIKATSIOON KRIISI AJAL: EUROOPA 
KOMISJONI KRIISIKOMMUNIKATSIOON NING SELLE TAGAJÄRJED 
REPUTATSIOONILE JA LEGITIIMSUSELE 
Tiina Pai 
Resümee 
 
Viimasel kümnendil on Euroopa Liitu tabanud mitmed kriisid, võib täheldada püsivat 
kriisiseisundit, millega toimetulemisel EL alati kõige edukam ei ole olnud. Peale otsese, 
nähtava ja igapäevaselt tajutava mõju, ohustavad kriisid ka Euroopa Liidu ja tema 
institutsioonide reputatsiooni ja legitiimsust. Kriis ongi käesolevas magistritöös mõistetud 
ohuna organisatsiooni reputatsioonile ja/või legitiimsusele. 
 
Reputatsioon ja legitiimsus on küll seonduvad kuid kindlasti mitte sisuliselt täiesti samad 
mõisted. Legitiimsus on seotud organisatsiooni vastavusega kindlaksmääratud või 
implitsiitsetele standarditele või eeskirjadele. Reputatsiooni võib käsitleda organisatsiooni 
positiivse eristumisena huvirühmade silmis teiste samataoliste seast. Nende omavaheline 
suhe on keeruline, kuid reputatsioonikapitali vähenemine mõjutab aja jooksul kindlasti ka 
legitiimsust.  
 
Reputatsiooni saab kriisiolukorras parandada kriisikommunikatsiooni abil. William Benoit 
maine parandamise teooria ja sellele toetuv Timothy Coombsi väljatöötatud situatsiooniline 
kriisikommunikatsiooniteooria, milles määratletakse eri strateegiad, mida kriisis 
organisatsioon kasutab/võiks kasutada, on leidnud kasutust paljude organisatsioonide, 
ametiisikute ja poliitikute kriisikommunikatsiooni analüüsimisel. Euroopa Liit on samuti 
defineeritav organisatsioonina ja Euroopa Komisjoni kommunikatsioonistrateegia 
tavaolukorras on väga sarnane mis tahes korporatiivsele kommunikatsioonile. Seepärast 
saabki nimetatud kahe kriisikommunikatsiooniteooria kombineerimisel nende abil uurida 
ka Euroopa Komisjoni kriisikommunikatsiooni ja leida vastuse uurimisküsimusele, milleks 
on: milliseid kriisikommunikatsioonistrateegiaid Euroopa Komisjon kasutab ja millised on 
nende sotsiaalsed tagajärjed reputatsiooni ja legitiimsuse vaatepunktist. 
 96 
 
Et Euroopa Komisjoni kriisikommunikatsiooni kohta puuduvad avalikult kättesaadavad 
dokumendid ja materjalid, on seda võimalik uurida komisjoni presidendi ja kriisist 
puudutatud poliitikavaldkonna eest vastutava voliniku kõnede analüüsi abil. President ja 
volinikud on ainsad, kellel on volitused kriisiolukorras sõna võtta, kes ei allu väga rangelt 
piiratud tavakommunikatsiooni suhtes kehtivatele reeglitele, samuti on kõned vahetuim 
kommunikatsiooniakt, neis sisalduv teave on väärtuslik uurimismaterjal. Kuigi kõnedel on 
olemas esmane publik, on need alati suunatud kõigile Euroopa Liidu kodanikele, vastates 
nii kogu komisjoni kommunikatsiooni peamisele eesmärgile – selgitada kodanikele, et 
Euroopa Liit toimib nendega arvestades ja nende nimel. 
 
Käesolevas magistritöös käsitletakse kolme Euroopa integratsiooni alustalasid kõigutavat 
kriisi – Kreeka võlakriis, rändekriis ja Brexit. Esimene neist seadis kahtluse alla Euroopa 
Liidu ühe sümboli, eurotsooni püsimajäämise, teine mõjutas tugevalt isikute vaba liikumist, 
mis on siseturu põhielemente ja kolmas on kahjustanud Euroopa Liidu aluspõhimõtteid, 
mille kohaselt koos ja ühiste väärtuste alusel toimides saavutatakse enam kui rahvuslikke 
huvisid esikohale seades. 
 
Käesolevas magistritöös on analüüsitud 231 kõnet, mis on kõik saadud Euroopa Komisjoni 
andmebaasist RAPID. Uurimiseks on kasutatud Norman Fairclough teooriale tuginedes 
kriitilist diskursuseanalüüsi, kolmedimensioonilist mudelit. Kõned analüüsitakse, leiud 
kirjeldatakse ja asetatakse sotsiaalsesse konteksti, siis interpreteeritakse neid lähtuvalt 
kriisikommunikatsiooniteooriatest, määratakse kindlaks kriisiklastrid ja konkreetsed 
kasutatud strateegiad, seejärel jõutakse selgitavasse etappi, mille käigus avaliku arvamuse 
küsitluste ja meediaretseptsiooni abil hinnatakse strateegia kasutamise ühiskondlikke 
tagajärgi reputatsiooni ja legitiimsuse aspektist. 
 
Analüüsi põhjal selgus, et kuigi Euroopa Komisjoni ja Euroopa Liidu reputatsiooni ja 
legitiimsust mõjutavad paljud tegurid, siis on kriisikommunikatsioonil, valitud strateegiatel 
siiski oma mõju. Kreeka kriisi puhul, milles kasutati erinevaid strateegiaid, kuid milles 
domineerisid taastavad ja pehmendavad strateegiad kombinatsioonis ründaja 
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süüdistamisega, said tugevasti kahjustada reputatsioon, kuid legitiimsus mitte niivõrd. 
Selles tulemuses võis mängida oma rolli strateegiate paljusus, mis oli omakorda tingitud nii 
kriisiklastri muutusest kui ka kriisi kestusest, strateegiate olukorrale mittevastav 
kasutamine ja parandusmeetmete võtmine, kuid neid käsitleva kriisikommunikatsiooni 
puudulikkus. Vähene mõju legitiimsusele on omistatav eelnevale väga tugevale 
reputatsioonikapitalile. 
 
Rändekriisi puhul, milles olid põhilisteks strateegiateks parandusmeetmed, soosingu 
otsimine ja süü teiste kaela veeretamine, kahjustus reputatsioon, kuid legitiimsusega seotud 
näitajad püsisid positiivsed isegi neis liikmesriikides, kes komisjoni kriisihaldusmeetmeid 
kõige vaenulikumalt vastu võtsid. Vähene mõju legitiimsusele võis olla tingitud 
reputatsiooni kiirest paranemisest kriisi vältel, sest selle kriisi puhul oli 
kriisikommunikatsioon asjakohane ja järjepidev, oli ju tegu jagatud pädevusse kuuluva 
poliitikavaldkonnaga, kus Euroopa Komisjon pidevat liikmesriikide toetust vajas. 
 
Brexiti puhul, milles kasutati vahelduvalt leevendavaid strateegiaid, süü teise kaela 
veeretamist ja parandusmeetmeid, on kriisikommunikatsiooni sotsiaalsed tagajärjed 
reputatsiooni ja legitiimsuse seisukohast vaadelduna kõige paremad – nii reputatsiooni kui 
ka legitiimsusega seotud näitajad on tugevad ja kõrged, meediakajastus valdavalt 
neutraalne või positiivne. Selle üheks põhjuseks võib pidada kriisikommunikatsiooni 
ühtsust ja strateegiate vähesust ja olukorrale vastavust. Euroopa Komisjoni positsioon selles 
kriisis on tugev, tal on ainupädevus ja ka kriisiklaster on selline, et talle omistatav vastutus 
kriisis on väike. 
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